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I. INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment, protects an individual's interest in
freedom from unreasonable government intrusions into personal
privacy. 2 When a court finds an investigative technique to be a
search within the Amendment's meaning, it effectively concludes that
Fourth Amendment protection should apply.3 If the government
activity constitutes a search, that activity must be reasonable. If the
activity does not amount to a search, however, the government enjoys
4
virtual freedom to conduct that activity as unreasonably as it pleases.
For pure investigatory searches,5 the United States Supreme
Court has found that the probable cause requirement 6 strikes the
proper balance in defining reasonableness. 7 Unlike searches in other
contexts," the Court has refused to apply any standard of suspicion
lower than probable cause.9 This requirement imposes a substantial
burden on police officers to gather significant amounts of evidence
before conducting a search. As a result of the cost of meeting this high
standard of suspicion, the Court has excused certain police activities
that intrude minimally on personal property, such as canine sniffs,
from the rigors of the Amendment by concluding that these intrusions
are not searches.'0

1.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Coast., Amend. IV.
2.
Katz v. United States,389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
3.
Horton u. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1982). See also
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 356 (1972)
(noting that the term "search" is one of limitation).
4.
Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 393.
5.
This Note defines pure investigatory searches narrowly as those that have no other
purpose than to detect or discover evidence of crime. The term does not include frisks, searches
incident to arrest, or inventory searches, all of which find their genesis in a rationale apart from
the search for evidence only. See Part I.B for a discussion of the differences between these
searches and the pure investigatory search.
6.
The probable cause requirement dictates that police may not search or seize without
probable cause. The Court has found probable cause when trustworthy facts and circumstances
within the knowledge of the officers are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the items to be searched or seized bear evidence of a crime. Carrollv.
UnitedStates, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
7.
See, for example, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,328-29 (1987).
8.
See, for example, Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (approving of a protective
sweep of a home based on reasonable suspicion to prevent potential harm to officers).
9.
Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328-29.
10. See, for example, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (concluding that a
canine sniff is not a search).
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Canine sniffs" pose an interesting Fourth Amendment problem
because they can reveal the presence of concealed narcotics that otherwise might remain hidden from detection. The sniff constitutes a
search because it discloses the contents of an item in which the
suspect possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy.' 2 The use of a
dog's nose, however, poses less of an intrusion into personal privacy
than general rummaging or prying into a physical area because the
sniff does not reveal private information about its subject beyond
what the dog can detect. Because of the effectiveness and limited
scope of intrusiveness, canine sniffs are a valuable tool in the fight
against drug trafficking. At the same time, the sniffs limited scope of
intrusiveness substantially protects citizens' interests in privacy. By
applying a traditional probable cause requirement to sniffs, a court
would defeat these attractive features of the canine sniffs because
police armed with probable cause could, and presumably would, conduct more indiscriminate searches. With few exceptions, federal
courts, which are wed to a strict probable cause requirement for pure
investigatory searches, have concluded that canine sniffs do not
constitute searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
By concluding that a canine sniff does not amount to a search,

11. A canine sniff is a police technique that uses highly trained dogs to sniff for contraband
items, such as explosives or narcotics. These dogs are used to check people and their effects
entering the United States, luggage on airplanes or buses, air freight, automobiles, and storage
facilities. Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.2(0 at 366 (West, 2d ed. 1987).
The dogs receive extensive training. To enter a training program, a dog must pass an
entrance exam exhibiting the dog's natural retrieving ability, nasal sensitivity, energy,
willingness, inquisitiveness, and boldness. Roughly one of every 130 applicants is accepted into
the training programs, and trainers rescreen the dogs throughout the course. From the dog's
perspective, training is a game of hide and seek. The dog learns the scent of the contraband item,
which the trainers hide in open fields, buildings, cars, and other locations that the dogs win
encounter during their careers. A dog will alert to the scent of the contraband item by snarling,
barking, whining, or pawing at a container, and each dog may respond differently. Max A.
Hansen, Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the Government's Supersniffers Come Down with
a Caseof ConstitutionalNasal Congestion?, 13 San Diego L. Rev. 410, 415 & n.25 (1976).
Dogs that graduate from the training program are quite accurate and effective. A canine has
a sense of smell eight times stronger than a human's and can discover evidence from a distance of
seventy-five feet. John Schuster, Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Use of Canines to Detect
Evidence of Crime, 44 Fordam L. Rev. 973, 986 (1976). A trained dog may alert to less than onemillionth of a gram of cocaine. United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714
n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This accuracy may be misleading because the dogs sometimes err by reacting
to noncontraband materials. See id. (noting that dogs may alert to money alone 10% of the time
because up to 97% of all currency in the U.S. contains traces of cocaine); Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F.
Supp. 1012, 1015-17 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (involving the sniff of a student who recently had played
with a dog in heat).
12. Justice Harlan developed the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in his concurrence
in Katz. The test asks whether the defendant possessed a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object searched and whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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however, federal courts cede all discretion to the police to conduct this
activity at their whim.
This result contradicts the Fourth
Amendment's concern with preventing arbitrary intrusions into
personal privacy.
Concerned with the lack of limits on police authority, a number
of states have concluded that the use of narcotics-sniffmng dogs
amounts to a search under their state constitutions, but they have
added that these minimally intrusive searches may be valid under the
reasonable suspicion standard established in Terry v. Ohio.13 In doing
so, these courts have stretched the Terry doctrine beyond its intended
scope. 14 These decisions raise a host of questions about this new
exception to the probable cause requirement for pure investigatory
searches, particularly with regard to the exception's scope and
applicability to other types of police searching activities.
This Note examines the prudence of establishing a reasonable
suspicion standard to accommodate minimally intrusive pure
investigative activities like canine sniffs. Part II traces the history
and development of the reasonable suspicion standard and the
Supreme Court's reluctance to apply this standard to pure investigatory searches. Part III examines the result of this reluctance in federal canine sniff cases and surveys several state cases that apply a
reasonable suspicion standard to canine sniffs. Part IV discusses the
policy reasons behind the use of a reasonable suspicion standard in
reviewing minimally intrusive searches, concludes that a reasonable
suspicion standard is necessary to regulate certain types of minimally
intrusive pure investigatory searches, and develops a test to
determine when a pure investigatory technique warrants this lower
standard of suspicion. This Note concludes that states creating a
canine sniff exception to the probable cause requirement should construe the exception narrowly to prevent the imposition of a broad
balancing test in the pure investigatory context.

13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Many commentators agree with this result. See, for example,
LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.2(f) at 375-76 (cited in note 11); Thomas H. Peebles, The
Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 Ga. L.
Rev. 75, 95 (1976). But see Lina Shahin, Comment, The ConstitutionalPostureof Canine Sniffs, 9
Touro L. Rev. 645, 697 (1993) (concluding that the use of dogs does not amount to a search).
14.
Terry was intended to apply only to limited weapons searches for the safety of the
officer. It expressly did not apply to searches for evidence. See notes 68-69 and accompanying
text.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Evolution of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
1. The Probable Cause Requirement
Prior to Camara v. Municipal Court of San Fransisco1 and
Terry v. Ohio,16 courts assumed that a search or seizure was
reasonable within the meaning of the first clause of the Fourth
Amendment only if the government actors possessed a warrant based
on probable cause as required by the Amendment's second clause. 1 7
Although courts recognized exceptions to the second, or 'Warrant"
Clause, they still required probable cause as a minimum threshold for
a search to be reasonable under the first, or "Reasonableness"
Clause."' The rationale behind this requirement lay in the belief that
the meaning of the Warrant Clause would evaporate if courts found
searches and seizures reasonable on a standard of suspicion less than
probable cause. 19 Probable cause provided a textually rooted standard
that prevented subjective judicial decisionmaking or lack of judicial
restraint leading to the erosion of the rigors of the Fourth
Amendment.20 Moreover, the Supreme Court believed that rules
encouraging police officers to obtain prior judicial approval before
acting on their suspicions could prevent unreasonable searches and
seizures most effectively.21 The courts, therefore, strictly applied the
probable cause requirement.

15. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. See, for example, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
The
reasonableness clause states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S.
Const., Amend. IV. The Warrant Clause then provides: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.* Id. Comentators and jurists have long debated
the proper relationship between the two clauses. Essentially this debate is between those who
favor strict adherence to the Warrant Clause and those who favor a broader sliding.scale
approach to the first clause's command of reasonableness. See Parts IV.A and V.B for a
discussion of this debate.
18. See, for example, Carroll,267 U.S. at 155-56.
19. See, for example, Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 479 (noting that the requirements of reliability
and particularity on which an officer may act cannot be less than when a warrant is obtained).
20. Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara andTerry, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 387 (1988).
21. See, for example, Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 479.
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Strict application of the probable cause requirement had its
costs. Probable cause limited an officer's searching capability in two
ways. First, it required police officers to gather a satisfactory quantum of evidence before conducting the search. The greater suspicion
required for probable cause increases the investment of police time
and resources. Second, a probable cause requirement limited the
scope of the officer's legitimate search.22 Moreover, the exclusionary
rule prevented the admission of evidence gained by a search or seizure
not based on probable cause.2 For traditional police searches, these
costs reflect the commensurate benefit to individual privacy that the
Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. For searching activities that
intrude less than ordinary searches, however, these law enforcement
costs exceed the offsetting benefit to individual privacy. Recognizing
the imbalance that these restrictions posed to less intrusive searching
activities, judges often defined these investigative activities as beyond
the scope of the Amendment's protections to allow admission of
otherwise tainted evidence.24
By declining to apply any Fourth
Amendment restrictions to these searching activities, courts foreclosed
any inquiry into the reasonableness of the activity or its intrusiveness,
leaving police officers free to conduct these activities at their
discretion.
In Katz v. United States,25 the Court created a two-part test to
analyze police investigatory procedures under the Fourth
Amendment. The test first asks whether the activity at issue constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It then
asks whether that search is reasonable. Recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,26 Katz expanded the scope of
the Fourth Amendment's protection by redefining the meaning of a
search to include any invasion into an area in which an individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy.27 The Court did not take such
revolutionary steps,however, with regard to the reasonableness prong
22. The officer could look for only those items that he had cause to believe were present at
the place searched. For example, if the officer was searching for stolen television sets, he could
not rifle through the suspect's desk.
23. See, for example, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. For example, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928), the Court held
that electronic surveillance of the defendant did not amount to a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment because the technique did not intrude physically into an area protected by
the Amendment. This narrow definition of search excluded many forms of electronic monitoring
from the rigors of the Fourth Amendment.
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. Id. at 351.
27. Id. at 351-52. In doing so, the Court overturned Olmatead, 277 U.S. 438. Katz focused
on an individual's expectations of privacy, and subsequent cases have focused on the test set out
in Justice Harlan's concurrence. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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of the Katz test. Instead, the Court maintained that a search
conducted without a warrant and probable cause is per se
unreasonable.28 By linking the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
reasonableness to the Warrant Clause, the Katz Court retained the
same cost-benefit regime that had led the Court to restrict the Fourth
Amendment's scope in earlier cases.
In the cases following Katz, the Court has relied on Katz's
expectation-of-privacy test to establish new and retain old limits on
the Fourth Amendment's scope.2 9
Moreover, the Katz test's
preoccupation with probable cause and reasonable privacy
expectations forces courts to focus exclusively on an individual's
Fourth Amendment interest in privacy. Katz and subsequent pure
investigatory search cases, in effect, ignored the Amendment's concern
that government searching conduct be reasonable and not arbitrary.
2. The Development of Reasonable Suspicion
Although the Court maintained a strong preference for
probable cause in the pure investigatory search context, it relaxed
this standard in other situations. The housing inspection cases
provide insight into the policies underlying this shift. In Frank v.
Maryland,"o the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply
to housing inspections and upheld the arrest of a Baltimore resident
who refused to allow a health inspector to conduct a warrantless
search of his house.31 The Court based its conclusion on several
28. Id. at 357.
29. See, for example, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-12 (1986) (holding that the
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his backyard, which was surrounded by a
ten-foot fence, because the fence might not shield the defendant's marijuana patch from the view
of a citizen or policeman perched on top of a truck or double-decker bus); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) (reaffirming the open fields doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924), under an expectation-of-privacy analysis); Californiav. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)
(holding that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in curbside garbage).
30. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
31.
Although the Court recognized the individual's interest in privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police, it limited the application of the Fourth Amendment to situations in which
the evidence of a search or seizure was sought for use in a criminal proceeding against the
defendant. Id. at 366. The Court reasoned that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to
apply primarily to situations in which evidence was sought for criminal prosecutions or
forfeitures. Id. at 365. According to the Court, the inspection's goal was merely to determine if
the defendant's residence violated the city's health codes. The city would notify the defendant so
that he could cure the problem if evidence of a violation was found. Thus, the Court concluded
that the Fourth Amendment could not be invoked in the present case. Id. at 365-66. Moreover,
the Court recognized that the use of inspectors to ensure compliance with the state's regulatory
scheme dated back to the Revolution. Id. at 367-70. Thus, 'the inspection [at issue] touch[ed] at
most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the [Fourth] Amendments
protection against official intrusion.* Id. at 367.
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factors. First, it found that the privacy interests at stake were not as
great as those in the criminal context.3 2 Second, the Court recognized
the value of the investigatory procedure involved. It noted that the
power to inspect residences, either pursuant to a schedule or to treat a
specific problem, served as an indispensable tool in maintaining
community health.-3 Third, the Court recognized that the traditional
warrant and probable cause requirements would undermine the
government's enforcement efforts in this area. 34 Fourth, the Court
noted that the statutes authorizing the search limited the inspector's
discretion. Specifically, it acknowledged that under the statutes, an
inspector needed to possess valid grounds before he could demand
entry.3 5 Rather than amend application of the traditional warrant and
probable cause requirements to fit the specific needs of housing
inspections, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply36
In overruling Frank, the Court in Camara v. Municipal Court
of San Francisco37 broadened the scope of the Fourth Amendment to
situations beyond criminal law enforcement and, at the same time,
signaled an initial shift away from the traditional probable cause
requirement. The CamaraCourt recognized that the basic purpose of
the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard an individual's privacy and
security against arbitrary governmental intrusions.38 In examining
32. Id. at 366. Specifically, the Court stated that the attempted inspection of the
defendant's residence was merely to enforce the health code, not for criminal investigatory
purposes. Moreover, the inspection was conducted with due regard for every convenience of time
and place. Id.
33. Id. at 372.
34. Id. By comparison, the dissenters proposed a flexible definition of probable cause to
comply with the Warrant Clause. Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The plurality found,
however, that if the Constitution required a warrant, the Warrant Clause's mandate of probable
cause could not be interpreted flexibly. Id. at 373.
35. Id. at 366. Indeed, the Court found that the pile of rubbish in the yard and the overall
disrepair of the house satisfied the proper requirement of suspicion. Id.
36. Id. at 373. The dissenters in Frank charged that the majority had construed the scope
of the Fourth Amendment too narrowly. The dissenters argued not only that failure to comply
with city health ordinances could lead to criminal prosecutions, but also that the Court misread
history in claiming that the Fourth Amendment primarily related to searches for evidence to be
used in criminal trials. Id. at 375-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissenters recognized that the
Fourth Amendment had a much wider scope. Id. at 377. According to the dissent, the Fourth
Amendment protected an individual's privacy right in his home. This right belonged to all people,
not just to those accused of a crime. Id. at 377-78. Indeed, the dissenters observed that the public
interest in protecting privacy is equally great in the criminal and regulatory contexts. Id. at 382.
The dissenters concluded that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant on the facts at issue in
Frankbut added that a health official should not need to show the same quantum of proof to a
magistrate as one must show when seeking evidence of a crime. Rather, the test of probable
cause required by the Fourth Amendment could account for the nature of the requested search.
Id. at 383.
37. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
38. Id. at 528.
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the four underlying factors considered in Frank,the Court agreed with
three of them. The Camara Court agreed that a routine inspection of
the condition of private property is less intrusive than a typical search
for evidence of a crime 39 and that health regulations had an overriding
public value. 40 The Camara Court also agreed that the traditional
warrant and probable cause requirements would undermine government enforcement efforts.41 It disagreed, however, with the Frank
Court as to the value of statutory safeguards as an effective limit on
officer discretion. 42 The Camera Court found that broad statutory
safeguards could not serve as a substitute for individualized judicial
review, particularly when a citizen might incur criminal liability by
attempting to invoke those safeguards.4 Moreover, the CamaraCourt
recognized that by exempting regulatory inspections from the Fourth
Amendment, the Court effectively would leave the resident subject to
the discretion of the officer in the field.44 The Court concluded that the
Fourth Amendment must apply to administrative searches like the
one at issue in Camara.45 While the Court believed that housing
searches generally were reasonable, it apparently recognized a
potential for government abuse, prompting the need for Fourth
Amendment controls and judicial oversight.
After finding that the Amendment's protections applied, the
Camara Court next addressed the problem of accommodating the
special needs posed by regulatory searches. The Court stated that the
test for determining reasonableness was a balancing of the
government's need to search against the individual's interest in
39. Id. at 530.
40. Id. at 535. The Court noted that the primary governmental interest at stake was the
prevention of even the unintentional development of hazardous conditions posing harms to public
health and safety. Id. Moreover, the Court recognized that routine periodic inspections may be
the only effective method of achieving universal compliance. Id. at 535-36.
41. Id. at 537 (quoting Frank v. Maryland,359 U.S. at 367-71).
42. Id. at 532-33.
43. Id. at 533.
44. Id. at 532. The dissenters sharply disagreed that the challenged ordinances left enough
discretion to the officers in the field to be considered unreasonable. Rather, the dissent stated
that these inspections met the Amendment's reasonableness requirement consistent with cases
interpreting it. Id. at 549 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissent noted: 'There is nothing here that
suggests that the inspection was unauthorized, unreasonable, for any improper purpose, or
designed as a basis for a criminal prosecution; nor is there any indication of any discriminatory,
arbitrary, or capricious action affecting the appellant in either case." Id. According to the dissent,
the defendant could have raised questions about the regulatory search at issue by demanding to
see the inspector's identification, writing to his supervisor, or asking the district attorney to
justify the search. Id.
45. Id. at 534. Specifically, the Court held that regulatory inspections are significant
intrusions on the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and that these searches,
conducted outside the scope of the Amendment and absent a warrant, lack the traditional
safeguards guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
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privacy.4 Rather than rely on the Reasonableness Clause alone, the
Court created a flexible definition of probable cause that met the
requirements of reasonableness. 47 The Court believed that this
approach neither eroded the warrant requirement nor diluted the
level of suspicion applicable to criminal investigations. Instead, a
flexible probable cause requirement gave content to competing public
and private interests and fulfilled the central purpose behind the
Fourth

Amendment

right

to

remain

free

from

unreasonable

government intrusions.4
In creating a flexible probable cause
standard, the Court allowed reasonableness to become a variable
factor in Fourth Amendment analysis. 49

The Court continued this shift away from the probable cause
requirement in Terry v. Ohio.w Terry involved the stop and frisk of a
suspect who the police officer believed was planning a robbery. The

Court defined a stop as a restraint of a suspect's freedom to walk
away, not amounting to a full arrest. 51 A frisk, however, involves a

limited search for weapons by patting down the exterior of a suspect's
clothing.5 2 The Terry Court rejected the idea that the Fourth
Amendment does not limit police conduct not amounting to a technical

arrest or full-blown search.s Rather, the Court concluded that a stop
46.
Id. at 536-37.
47. Id. at 534. According to the CamaraCourt, the Fourth Amendment required a warrant,
but the probable cause requirement and the attendant requirement of individualized suspicion
could be met if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting area inspections
were satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Id. at 538. The Court concluded that a
flexible probable cause standard would give content to the Reasonableness Clause without
undermining the traditional warrant requirement. Id. at 539. Under the Court's rubric, "[i]f a
valid public interest justifie[d] the intrusion contemplated, then there [would be] probable cause
to issue a suitably restricted warrant." Id.
48. Id. The dissenters, led by Justice Clark, replied that this new flexible standard would
degrade the Fourth Amendment by diluting the probable cause requirement to the point that
magistrates would become mere rubber stamps. Id. at 547-48 (Clark, J., dissenting).
49. Sundby, 72 Minn. L. Rev. at 393 (cited in note 20). According to Professor Sundby, the
Court simply reversed the roles of probable cause and reasonableness: instead of probable cause
defining which practices were reasonable, reasonableness determined when a practice met
probable cause. Id. at 394.
50. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Like the situations underlying Frank and Camara,the stop and frisk
tested the limits of the warrant requirement as a tool for regulating police conduct. Although the
conduct did not constitute a full-blown arrest or search, it certainly amounted to an intrusion on
personal liberty. The Court was forced to find a way to place limits on this type of police behavior
while still allowing officers some freedom to initiate investigations, maintain the peace, and
protect themselves.. In doing so, the Court abandoned the warrant requirement and probable
cause threshold, creating a reasonable suspicion standard that required officers to have some
reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified their actions.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id. at 19. The Court framed the debate as follows:
On the one hand, it is frequently argued that in dealing with the rapidly unfolding and
often dangerous situations on city streets the police are in need of an escalating set of
flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess. For
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and frisk amounted to a seizure and search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."
As the Court in Camara did, the Terry Court focused on the
Fourth Amendment's underlying concern that governmental intrusions into personal privacy and security be reasonable and not arbitrary. Much of the Court's reasoning lay in the fear that excepting
stops and frisks from the limits of the Fourth Amendment would allow
the officer in the field too much discretion. The Court also expressed
concern about wholesale police harassment of minority groups.55 With
these underlying concerns in mind, the Court criticized those who
sought to insulate the initial stages of contact between the police and
citizens from constitutional scrutiny and concluded that the same
Fourth Amendment limits must apply to stops and frisks.5
Rather than turning to the Warrant Clause to determine
whether the search and seizure at issue met the dictates of the Fourth
Amendment, the Terry Court looked only to the Reasonableness
Clause 7 and determined, as it had in Camara, that reasonableness
this purpose
it is urged that distinctions should be made between a "stop" and an
.arrest" . .. and between a 'frisk" and a "search." This scheme is justified in part upon the
notion that a 'stop" and a 'frisk" amount to a mere "minor inconvenience and petty
indignity," which can properly be imposed upon the citizen in the interest of effective law
enforcement on the basis of a police officer's suspicion.
On the other side the argument is made that the authority of the police must be
strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the
traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment. It is contended with some force that
there is not--and cannot be-a variety of police activity which does not depend solely
upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest based
upon probable cause to make such an arrest. The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the
argument runs, is a severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon
protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed system of judical controls to
enforce upon the agents of the State the commands of the Constitution. Acquiescence by
the courts in the compulsion inherent in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it
is urged, would constitute an abdication of judicial control.
Id. at 10-12 (citations ommitted).
54. Id. at 16. The Court defined a stop as occurring 'whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Id. Moreover, the Court observed that any
suggestion that a frisk did not constitute a search tortured the English language. To conduct a
frisk, 'ft]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body[;] a
thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin
and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet." Id. at 17 n.13
(quoting L.L. Priar and T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. Crim. L.,
Criminology and Police Science 481 (1954)). This action amounts to more than a mere petty
indignity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. at 20. The Court explained:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether "probable cause" existed to justify the
search and seizure which took place.... But we deal here with an entire rubric of police
conduct-necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the
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must be defined by balancing the competing public and private interests at stake.5 While the Court recognized the government's interest
in stopping and frisking suspects, it indicated that individual interests
could not be served properly without an objective test requiring the
police officer to point to specific and articulable facts that, along with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify the intrusion.w
The Court created a reasonable suspicion standard, a lesser standard
of suspicion than the traditional probable cause requirement, to
review stops and frisks. Under this standard, an officer's actions
comply with the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause if they
were justified by the officer's reasonable, articulable suspicions.6
In applying this standard, the Court differentiated stops from
frisks. A stop based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminality meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment because it
effects only a minimal intrusion on the suspect's liberty interest while
allowing police officers to take reasonable action to detect and prevent
crime. 6 ' A frisk, however, reflects a severe, though limited, intrusion
on personal privacy.62 To be valid, therefore, the frisk must arise not
only on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but also on reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed.6 In addition,,the frisk itself
is limited to a search for weapons.6 4 This distinction between minimally intrusive seizures and minimally intrusive searches has endured; while the Court has recognized minimally intrusive seizures on
a reasonable-suspicion-of-crime rationale, minimally intrusive

officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not
be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead the conduct involved in this case must be
tested by the Fourth Amendments general proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 21 (quoting Camera, 387 U.S. at 534-35,536.37).
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. According to the Terry Court, the need for specificity of the
information on which police action is based is 'the central teaching" of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Id. at 21 n.18. Moreover, the Court recognized that a test relying on the officer's

good faith alone would undermine the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 22.
60. Id. at 27.
61. See id. at 22. Although a physical intrusion into one's liberty interest, a stop is a seizure
short of a technical arrest, and therefore effects only a minimal intrusion on the suspect. Thus,
the Court declined to stretch the general rule requiring probable cause for arrests to stops.
Instead, the Court treated the step as a sui generis type of police conduct, which is valid if based
on reasonable suspicion. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979). This stop rationale also
extends to packages. United States v. Place, 462 U.S 696,706 (1983).
62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id.
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searches require additional danger to be constitutional under the
reasonable suspicion standard.65
B. Police Searches on Less Than Probable Cause
Before examining pure investigatory searches and the retention of the probable cause requirement in that area, other types of
police searches that are permissible on standards of suspicion below
probable cause must be distinguished. The Court has approved police
searches that often result in the discovery of incriminating evidence
on standards of suspicion lower than probable cause in four general
contexts: Terry frisks, searches incident to lawful arrests, inventory
searches, and administrative searches. Three key features justify the
lesser standards of suspicion and distinguish these searches from pure
investigatory searches.
First, in all four situations, some relationship beyond the
normal citizen-officer relationship exists between the officer and the
searched party. In defending the Court's application of standards less
than probable cause for searches not involving the police, one
commentator stressed the importance of the relationship of the
government actor and the searched party. 66 For example, a teacher's
search of a student's purse without probable cause is justifiable, in
part, because of the student-teacher relationship, which involves
interests beyond those protected by the Fourth Amendment, such as a
student's interest in an education and a teacher's interest in
maintaining control of the classroom. 67 This relationship factor
applies equally well in the police context. In the four recognized
exceptions to the probable cause requirement, the nature of the
relationship between the officer and the searched party gives rise to
interests beyond those protected by the Fourth Amendment. These
interests, in turn, justify the underlying search. By comparison, the
pure investigatory search arises as part of the standard officer-citizen
relationship, involving no interests beyond those envisioned by the
Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, all four procedures are linked, in theory, to some
rationale beyond the need for criminal law enforcement. In contrast,

65.
Compare Place, 462 U.S. at 706 (recognizing a 'stop" of luggage on reasonable
suspicion), with Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327-29 (1987) (rebutting the existence of
'minimally intrusive searches for Fourth Amendment purposes).

66. William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment,
44 Stan. L. Rev. 553,555 (1992).
67. Id. at 565.
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a pure investigatory search is based solely on a law enforcement
rationale. Consequently, the scope of the four searches relates directly
to this relationship and the search's underlying rationale.
As noted above, Terry authorizes a limited frisk of a suspect for
weapons. The frisk stems from the development of a detainordetainee relationship that may necessitate the officer's efforts to protect his safety by disarming his detainee.68 The scope of the frisk is
limited to the search for weapons and must be justified by some objective suspicion that the defendant is armed. 69 This limit in scope arises
directly from the fact that the difference in a relationship from officercitizen to detainor-detainee is minor.70 This distinction does not justify any additional intrusion into privacy beyond the search necessitated by the safety rationale. Thus, if the officer had no suspicion that
the suspect was armed, the officer could not frisk his detainee.
By comparison, the right to conduct searches incident to lawful
71
arrest arises automatically upon the lawful arrest of the suspect.
Lawful arrest represents the development of an arrestor-arrestee
relationship, which is the starting point of the criminal process
against the defendant,'2 and the exercise of governmental domination
over the arrestee. 3 As arrestor, the officer has two interests: (1) to
protect both his own and the public's safety by preventing the
suspect's escape; and (2) to preserve evidence for trial by preventing
its concealment or destruction. 74 The scope of a search incident to
arrest, however, remains limited to a search of the arrestee's person
and the area within his immediate control .7 This limit prevents a
valid search incident to arrest from becoming a general exploratory
76
search for evidence, which would require probable cause.

68.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27.

69.

Id.

70.

See id. at 26. One may classify the detainor-detainee relationship as minor because it

falls short of an arrestor-arrestee relationship, which indicates the initiation of the criminal
process against the suspect. Id.
71.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
72. See note 70. Because the defendant's arrest is based on probable cause, the officer must
believe that he already has gathered enough evidence against the defendant to begin the criminal

process.
73.

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 232 (quoting People v. Chiagles,237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583, 584

(1923)).
74. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 230-31. The rationale of preserving evidence for trial differs from
a rationale of searching for evidence of guilt. If the defendant has been arrested, presumably the
state already has evidence of the defendant's guilt and is preventing its destruction, which may
easily occur if the evidence is on the defendant's person or within his reach. Chimel v. California,

395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
75. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
76. Id. at 763.
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Inventory searches also allow police to search suspects and
their possessions when taken into police custody." The rationale for
these searches stems from the custodial relationship, typically arising
from the arrest of a person or the impoundment of a vehicle.7 8 The
inventory search protects the suspect from loss or destruction of
personal articles and protects the police from frivolous claims of loss or
destruction.79 The inventory of personal articles also provides for the
safe administration of jails by preventing arrested individuals from
carrying weapons into the jail. so While the scope of these searches is
potentially broad, they are limited to items in which a bailment relationship arises, and police regulations must govern officer discretion to
conduct these searches."'
Similarly, administrative searches by police are based on regulations authorizing searches in noncriminal contexts and limiting
officer discretion in conducting the searches. The noncriminal purpose
may be closely linked to an underlying criminal purpose; 2 its
justification, however, lies squarely on the noncriminal rationale.8 In
addition, the search pursuant to regulations presumes some
regulatory relationship between the government and the citizen
searched.84 Moreover, the administrative search's rationale directly
85
circumscribes its scope.
C. ReasonableSuspicion and the Pure Investigatory Search
While the Court has entertained a standard of suspicion less
than probable cause for police searches in other contexts, it has not
77. See, for example, Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369 (1987) (describing the scope of
the police inventory of the defendant's van).
78. Id. at 372.
79. Id. at 372-73.
80. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983).
81. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-76.
82. See, for example, MichiganDep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding
the use of sobriety checkpoints, pursuant to state regulations, as a means of promoting highway
safety). While the checkpoints may have reduced the number of persons deciding to drive while
intoxicated, checkpoints also allowed the police to catch individuals who were driving drunk, a
criminal offense in Michigan.
83. See id. at 451 (describing the need to prevent drunk driving accidents).
84. The search and seizure affirmed in Sitz stemmed from the state's regulatory scheme of
automobiles and their drivers. The significant regulation of automobiles allows the government to
search vehicles in other contexts as well. See, for example, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106
(1986) (upholding the search for an automobile's vehicle identification number because of the
substantial regulation of automobiles).
85. In Sitz, the regulations authorized the highway patrol to stop and question motorists
briefly to determine if they were sober, but the Court acknowledged that more extensive stops
and searches may require additional suspicion to meet Fourth Amendment standards. Sitz, 496
U.S. at 450-51.
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used a balancing test or the reasonable suspicion standard for pure
investigatory searches. Rather, the Court consistently has demanded
a probable cause requirement for these searches. The rationale
behind this steadfastness lies in the belief that police officers cannot
perform the necessary balancing when making split-second decisions
and need the guidance of one familiar standard., Moreover, the Court
has emphasized that probable cause strikes the proper balance between public and private interests in the pure investigatory search
context. 7 Apparently, the Court presumes that all searches for purely
criminal investigatory purposes severely intrude on individual privacy
interests, obviating any need for a flexible range of suspicion
standards similar to those available for seizures.s This exclusive
focus on privacy interests ignores the existence of other Fourth
Amendment interests implicated during police searching activities.
In Arizona v. Hicks,"9 the Court issued one of its strongest
admonitions against a reasonable suspicion standard for pure investigatory searches. In Hicks, a police officer, while investigating a shooting in the defendant's ill-appointed apartment, moved a piece of expensive, and seemingly out of place, stereo equipment to read and
record its serial number.90 The Court held that this activity amounted
to a search under the Fourth Amendment because it exceeded the
scope of the officer's purpose for being in the apartment-to search for
victims, the shooter, or the gun.91 Absent valid probable cause, the

86. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979). In contrast, the Court used a
similar justification to excuse public employees from the rigors of probable cause when conducting
a search: "It is simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in most government agencies to learn the
subtleties of the probable cause standard." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724-25 (1987).
According to the Court, the police are incapable of learning the intricacies of a reasonableness
standard while other public employees could not possibly grasp the difficult subtleties of the
probable cause standard. This contradiction begs the question as to which standard is easier to
apply.
87. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214 (stating that "[flor all but those narrowly defined intrusions,
the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the
principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause"). See also United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that
"the Framers... balanced the interests involved and decided that a seizure is reasonable only if
supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause"). In Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct.
2130 (1993), Justice Scalia challenged the validity of frisks absent probable cause. See id. at 213941 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated: "I frankly doubt... whether the fiercely proud
men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on
mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity... .' Id. at 2140 (emphasis in

original).
88. See text accompanying notes 61-65.
89. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
90. Id. at 323. The police officer suspected that the equipment was stolen and wanted to
report the serial numbers to his headquarters. Id.
91. Id. at 324-35. Specifically, the Court observed:
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search was unreasonable.9 2 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor urged
that the officer's actions were minimally intrusive because the
primary invasion of privacy occurred when the officers entered the
home9 3 She believed that the officer made a mere cursory
examination of the stereo equipment, justified by his reasonable suspicion that the stereo was stolen 4 In a sharp response, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, replied that the Court had never
recognized a procedure that falls between a plain-view observance,
which is not a search and does not require any level of suspicion,9 5 and
a full-blown search, requiring probable cause.9 6 The majority
remained unwilling to recognize a new reasonable suspicion standard
for minimally intrusive searches.97 Instead, the Court chose to adhere
to the traditional probable cause standard.9 8
Adherence to the probable cause requirement has created an
all-or-nothing regime for pure investigatory searches. Either a pure
The officer's moving of the equipment... did constitute a 'search" separate and apart
from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of [the
officer's] entry into the apartment .... Making action, unrelated to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its
contents, did produce a new invasion of respondents privacy unjustified by the exigent
circumstance that validated the entry.... It matters not that the search uncovered
nothing of any great personal value to respondent-serial numbers rather than (what
might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or
photographs. A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of
a turntable.
Id. Because the underside of the stereo could not contain the shooter, victims, or the weapon,
turning the stereo over exceeded the scope of the original search and, thus, amounted to a new
search.
Apparently, the fact that the stereo equipment was suspected contraband did not affect this
conclusion. But see notes 119-29 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in United States
v. Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109 (1984), that an individual does not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in contraband). Two factors distinguish Hicks and Jacobsen: (1) unlike Jacobsen, Hicks
involved police activity occurring within a residence, and (2) moving the stereo equipment
exposed areas of the apartment that otherwise would have remained concealed.
92. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326.
93. Id. at 338 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 335.
95. As noted in Katz v. United States, an object exposed to the public in plain view receives
no Fourth Amendment protection. 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967).
96. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328.
97. Id. at 328-29. Specifically, the Court stated that it was "unwilling to send police and
judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain description..
." Id. While Justice O'Connor asserted in her dissent that the Court previously had recognized
that searches may vary in intrusiveness and that some brief searches may be so minimally
intrusive as to be justified on reasonable suspicion, the cases on which she relied refer to
minimally intrusive seizures, which indeed have been recognized by the Court. See id. at 327
(cataloging cases that classify minimally intrusive seizures). Compare id. at 337 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Place as stating that minimally intrusive searches may be
justified on reasonable suspicion) with United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (stating
that seizures, not searches, may be justified on articulable suspicion).
98. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 329.
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investigatory activity amounts to a search within the meaning of the
Amendment and requires probable cause to be reasonable, or it does
not constitute a search and thus requires no inquiry into
reasonableness whatsoever. The practical effect is to subject the more
intrusive searching activities to the probable cause requirement and
to excuse lesser intrusions from judicial scrutiny altogether. For
example, rummaging through a suspect's garbage,9 9 walking across
his open fields, 10 looking over his ten-foot fence into his backyard,101
flying over his property to peer through a hole in the roof of his
greenhouse,102 and recording the telephone numbers he dialed °a do not
constitute searches.
The Court has explained these cases by
concluding that society does not recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in the searched item. 10 4 Yet, one might better understand these cases as expressing a judicial decision that a probable
cause standard should not apply to these minimally intrusive types of
police activity.10 5
The Court never addressed this issue expressly; yet, in deciding
these cases, the Court arguably made implicit findings that the costs
oft imposing a probable cause requirement outweighed the
corresponding benefits to individual privacy. 1°6 In these cases, the
99. Californiav. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
100. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
101. Californiav. Ciraolo,476 U.S. 207 (1986).
102. Floridav. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
103. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). This catalog of exceptions from the Fourth
Amendment certainly is not intended to be exhaustive.
104. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing Katz v. United States).
105. In Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth
Circuit expressly observed that finding a police activity to be a search was, in effect, a conclusion
about whether the Fourth Amendment applied at all. Id. at 476. In concluding that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to canine sniffs of lockers or automobiles in a school parking lot, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that sniffs of the lockers and cars occurred from a vantage point where the
officer and dog lawfully stood and were, therefore, within the "plain smell* of the officer and dog.
Id. at 477.
While similar logic could apply to the sniffs of students, the court believed this circumstance
presented an entirely separate problem. Id. Why this assertion should be true is unclear. The
police and dogs were as lawfully situated when the dogs sniffed the students as when they sniffed
the lockers, and a person's odor is as plainly apparent in the area around him as his locker's smell
is around it. Yet, the court recognized that the cost to individual privacy and dignity is greater
when the dog sniffs a person rather than his unattended locker or car. Id. at 478 (quoting Martin
R. Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectiveson Fourth Amendment Scope, 74
Nw. U. L. Rev. 803, 850 (1980) (agreeing that the intensive smelling of people is indecent and
demeaning)). Thus, the court classified this activity as a search in order to place some
constitutional restrictions on the use of dogs to sniff people. Id. at 478-80.
106. More specifically, the Court may believe that rummaging through someone's garbage
intrudes minimally on his privacy and that the gain from this practice outweighs the loss to
individual privacy in the abandoned matter. Implicit in this conclusion is an understanding that
the cost of imposing a probable cause requirement would not provide a commensurate benefit to
the privacy interests at stake.
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intrusion into individual interests was low, and the Court seemed
unconcerned about the prospect of arbitrary government use of these
searching methods.107 If the Court finds the potential costs to
individual privacy higher, though, the same activity may constitute a
search requiring probable cause. °8 By excusing activities from the
rigors of the Fourth Amendment with bold, categorical strokes,
however, the Court allows police to conduct searches arbitrarily and
makes no inquiry into their reasonableness.
Thus, in pure
investigatory searches, no middle standard exists between
suspicionless searches and those searches based on probable cause.
III. CANINE SNIFFS AND THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD
A canine sniff constitutes a pure investigatory searching activity because its sole purpose is crime detection. Federal and state
decisions relating to canine sniffs reflect the inherent tension between
the desire for strict adherence to the probable cause requirement in
the pure investigatory search context and the desire to place some
Fourth Amendment limits on police discretion to conduct canine sniffs,
which intrude significantly less on personal privacy than other forms
of searches. Federal courts, with few exceptions, 09 exempt canine
sniffs from the Fourth Amendment because they do not exact heavy
107. By comparison, the Court in Terry believed that the Fourth Amendment was intended
to assure that all degrees of government intrusion on personal security are reasonable. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1960).
Another consideration may rest on the belief that the police would not rummage through
someone's garbage unless they suspected that person of commiting a crime. Either the distaste in
rummaging through refuse provides a sufficient limit on police discretion or the belief that
individuals produce too much garbage to search everyone's garbage undergirds the belief that
individualized suspicion must be present before the police would go to such great lengths.
Because of these practical limits already inherent in the process, warrant and probable cause
requirements would exact too high a cost to police investigations without adding any comparably
valued benefit to individual privacy. The same analysis could be made of the overflight cases if
flights were made on an individual basis; however, this conclusion would ignore the possibility
that the police would achieve economies of scale in flying over large areas at one time to search
for narcotics. In each of the overflight cases, however, the government officials possessed
individualized suspicion. See Floridav. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Californiav. Ciraolo,476 U.S.
207 (1986); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
108. This rationale would reconcile the differences between Class and Hicks. Both cases
involved similar police activity of moving objects to detect identification numbers, but Hicks
occurred in a home where the cost imposed on individual privacy is high while Class occured in a
car where the cost to individual privacy is lower. Presumably, anyone can see the papers on top
of the defendant's dashboard, but few people can see what potentially lies beneath the stereo in
an apartment. Therefore, probable cause is required in one case, but not the other. This reason
also would explain the difference between sniffing lockers and sniffing people in Horton. See note
105.
109. See notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
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costs on individual privacy." 0 Several states, however, have imposed
some limited constitutional restrictions on the use of drug-sniffing
dogs.,,, Thus, these states have created a new exception to the
probable cause requirement based on their state constitutions.
A. The FederalApproach
In United States v. Place,112 the Court concluded that police
officers may seize luggage briefly to expose it to a narcotics-sniffing
dog if they have reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains
narcotics. 113 In two paragraphs unnecessary to the decision of the
case,114 the Court addressed the issue of whether the use of the dog in
this context amounted to a search. The court pointed to the unique" 5
and limited nature of the canine sniff, concluding that while the
defendant had a privacy interest in the contents of his luggage, the
sniffing procedure did not disclose any noncontraband items to public
view. 116 This limited disclosure ensured that the police did not subject
110. See Part III.A.
111. See PartIII.B.
112. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The majority of canine sniff cases before federal courts prior to
Place held that a canine sniff did not constitute a search, although the reasoning in the cases
varied. Horton, 690 F.2d at 476. But see United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated in 463 U.S. 1202 (1983).
113. Place, 462 U.S. at 706. The 90-minute seizure of the defendant's luggage, however, was
not brief enough to fall under this exception to probable cause. Therefore, the seizure was invalid.
Id. at 708-10.
114. Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). In fact, the defendant never raised
the argument that the sniff at issue was a search, and neither party briefed the issue before the
Court. Id. at 723 (Blackmun, J. concurring in the judgment). See also LaFave, 1 Search and
Seizure §2.2(0 at 369-70 & n.215 (cited in note 11).
115. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. The unsupported claim of the uniqueness of a canine sniff begs
the question as to how unique it really is. Some analogous procedures include breathalyzer tests,
metal detectors, radar guns, voice exemplars, and telephone pen registers. In each circumstance,
the procedure determines either the culpability of the individual or "nothing of special interest."
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Courts have found that the use of
breathalyzers and metal detectors constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment. See, for
example, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (breathalyzers);
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 802-03 (2d Cir. 1974) (metal detectors). The Court has
held the use of telephone pen registers, however, not to amount to a search within the Fourth
Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland,442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1976).
116. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Specifically, the Court stated:
We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal
luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. A "canine sniff' by a well-trained
narcotics detection dog, however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as
does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the
manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence
of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities
something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This
limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the
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the defendant to the embarrassment or inconvenience inherent in
broader searches."1 7 Thus, the canine sniff in this particular case did
not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 8 By concluding that the sniff was beyond the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court foreclosed any inquiry into the
reasonableness of the procedure.
In United States v. Jacobsen,"9 the Court affirmed this holding,
deciding that a chemical test to determine if a substance is cocaine did
not amount to a search. 2 0 The Jacobsen Court stated that a search
occurs when the government infringes on an expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable. 21 The Court opined, however,
that a reasonable expectation of privacy differs critically from the
expectation, however well justified, that certain criminal facts will not
come to the police's attention. 122 Thus, according to the Court, a
chemical test that discloses whether a substance is cocaine does not

embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive
investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we
conclude that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue
here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained
canine-did not constitute a "search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id. Essentially, the sniff constituted much less of an intrusion than other searching
methods that required probable cause and, therefore, could not itself constitute a search requiring
probable cause. This analysis, excluding canine sniffs from the Fourth Amendment because the
intrusion on personal privacy is slight, differs significantly from the Court's understanding of
minimally intrusive seizures. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the Court explained
that because limited seizures, or stops, constituted much less of a personal intrusion than typical
arrests, the Terry Court 'declined to stretch the concept of 'arrest'-and the general rule
requiring probable cause to make arrests reasonable under the Fourth Amendment-to cover
such intrusions.' Id. at 209. Rather, the Court treated the stop as unique police conduct within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. To determine the stop's reasonableness under the
Amendment, the Court balanced the limited intrusion on personal interests against the
government's opposing interest in crime prevention and detection. Id. While Dunaway implied
that a stop may require suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, see id., the Court in
Place approved these limited seizures based on reasonable suspicion of criminality, without any
overriding safety rationale. Place,462 U.S. at 706.
119. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
120. In Jacobsen, Federal Express agents discovered a powdery substance during an
investigation of-a damaged package and called the police. A police officer conducted a field test
and determined that the substance was cocaine. Id. at 111-12. The test involved the use of three
test tubes. When -cocaine is placed in one tube after another, liquids within the tubes change to
specific colors. Id. at 112 n.1.
121. Id. at 113. This test is essentially the same as the Harlan test established in Katz. See
notes 99-108 and accompanying text (discussing the use of Harlan's test to limit the Fourth
Amendment's scope).
122. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122.
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compromise any legitimate privacy interest. 123 Under the Court's
analysis, because Congress decided to treat the possession of cocaine
as an illegitimate interest, government conduct revealing only the
presence or absence of cocaine does not intrude on any legitimate
24

interest in privacy.1
In his dissent, Justice Brennan derided this narrow definition

of a search and criticized the Court's failure to focus on the Fourth
Amendment's interest in protecting individuals from unreasonable
government intrusions. Brennan's concern stemmed from the belief
that by excluding a class of surveillance techniques from the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court foregoes any opportunity to ensure
that police officers conduct those activities reasonably.125 According to
Brennan, the Court paved the way for technology to surpass the limits
of the Fourth Amendment in criminal investigations. 12 6 Brennan also
denounced the shift in focus from the context of the search to the

product of the search. 127

He stated that the Court should have

concluded that procedures, like canine sniffs, constitute minimally

intrusive searches that may be conducted as long as they are
reasonable under the balancing formula used in Terry.'2
Arguably, Place and Jacobsen are limited to their facts, leaving

open a number of questions regarding Fourth Amendment limits on
the use of drug-sniffing dogs.129 A minority of federal courts reviewing
123. Id. at 123.
124. Id. Under the Court's analysis, the Katz inquiry into the suspect's expectations of
privacy shifts from the area subject to the search to the object of the search. Thus, the Place
Court, after acknowledging the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in his luggage,
focused on the object of the procedure-the cocaine-to determine whether the ssearching
activity invaded any legitimate expectation of privacy. The Jacobsen Court characterized the
likelihood that these procedures, which disclose only the presence of contraband, would reveal
any private information as too remote to warrant regulation under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
124.
125. Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 137.38. Justice Brennan recognized that under the Court's analysis, "if a device
were developed that could detect, from the outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside,
there would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a residential
neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in which the drug is present." Id. at 138.
127. Id. at 138-39. Quoting from Katz that what a person seeks to preserve as private may
be constitutionally protected, 389 U.S. at 351-52, Justice Brennan stressed that the Court always
had looked to the manner in which an individual had attempted to preserve the private nature of
an item before determining whether an individual's expectation of privacy was reasonable.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 139-40. Thus, under Justice Brennan's view, a search would occur
whenever the police use any technique, like a dog sniff, to secure any information about an item
that is concealed in a container that supports a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 142.
128. Id. at 141. Justice Brennan concluded that under the Terry approach, 'the Fourth
Amendment inquiry would be broad enough to allow consideration of the method by which a
surveillance technique is employed as well as the circumstances attending its use." Id.
129. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.2(f) at 366 (cited in note 11). LaFave asserts that '[i]t
is extremely important to recognize that the Place holding does not validate the use of drug
detection dogs in all circumstances. The Court said only 'that the particular course of
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canine sniff cases have taken this approach, refusing to assume
automatically that the use of a canine sniff is not a search. For
example, in United States v. Thomas,30 the Second Circuit held a
canine sniff of the defendant's apartment door to be a search requiring
probable cause.13 The court observed that Place's finding that a sniff
in an airport does not constitute a search did not mean that a sniff
could never be a search. 3 2 Rather than focusing on the lack of
intrusion of a canine sniff, the Thomas court focused on the
defendant's expectation of privacy in his home.' . Because that
expectation is heightened, a practice deemed unintrusive at the
airport nonetheless may be intrusive in the home.134 The Thomas
court reasoned that a canine sniff remained a way of detecting the
contents of a private, enclosed area that the officer could not derive
from his own senses.13 5 Thus, the canine sniff intruded on the
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy and amounted to a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.136

investigation that the agents intended to pursue here-exposure of respondents luggage, which
was located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 373 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707). LaFave presents a
number of hypotheticals in which canine sniffs may constitute searches. For example, '[w]hat...
if the agents, anticipating Place's arrival, had simply been standing by with a drug detection dog
and, when Place paused momentarily in the corridor, had confronted him with the dog who
reacted positively?" LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.2(f) at 373. LaFave's argument is simply
that the use of dogs may require a different result when the objects sniffed are attended or if the
items sniffed include a person or residence. Id. at 373-74. The Court's logic in Place and
Jacobsen, however, is sufficiently broad to cover each of these situations. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's logic is unbounded). Yet, LaFave
indicates that a canine sniff could amount to a search if the cost to individual security escalates,
see LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.2(f) at 374, but this analysis remains separate from the
Court's conclusion that: (1) Place had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his
luggage, and (2) because none of those contents, other than the contraband, were disclosed, no
intrusion occurred. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
130. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
131. Id. at 1367.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1366. The court recognized that an individual's privacy interest in checked
luggage is less than his privacy interest in his home. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1367.
136. Id. Importantly, Thomas required a warrant and probable cause for the sniff of the
defendant's apartment. Other circuit courts have attempted to fashion some reasonable suspicion
standard on which to analyze canine sniffs within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. For
example, in United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1988), the court held a
canine sniff of the interior of the defendant's sleeper compartment on a train valid because the
authorities reasonably suspected the defendant of drug trafficking. To the extent that Whitehead
establishes a reasonable suspicion standard for this type of search, it conflicts with the Court's
refusal in Arizona v. Hicks to employ this standard in pure investigatory searches and raises
serious questions as to its precedential value.
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In United States v. Colyer,137 the D.C. Circuit criticized Thomas
for departing significantly from the reasoning used in Place and
Jacobsen. 3 8 The Colyer court interpreted the Place-Jacobsenholdings
to stand for the proposition that an individual can maintain no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband items; 13 9 thus, government conduct that reveals nothing about noncontraband items com14°
promises no legitimate expectation of privacy.
This broad conception of the Place-Jacobsenrule has become
the majority approach among the federal circuit courts.1 4' Thus, the
police may use dogs with impunity when sniffing train compartments, 142 bus luggage compartments and overhead bins, 143 unoccupied
automobiles,' 44 and occupied automobiles. 14 In addition, the Fourth

137. 878 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Colyer involved the sniffing of the defendant's sleeper
compartment on a train.
138. Presumably, under the Place Court's analysis, the Thomas court would have concluded
that although the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his
apartment, the use of the dog only disclosed that the defendant's apartment contained contraband
items and no other private fact. Because, by congressional fiat, an individual has no privacy or
possessory interest in drugs, the use of the dog effected no intrusion. See Place,462 U.S. at 707.
139. Colyer,878 F.2d at 475.
140. Id. (citing Jacobsen,466 U.S. at 124 n.24).
141. These decisions rest partially on the premise that dog sniffs are highly accurate
weapons in the police arsenal, but this assumption may be fairly challenged. In Doe v. Renfrow,
475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), school officials used a dog to sniff 2,780 junior and senior high
school students. 451 U.S. at 1022-23 (Brennan, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari). Of those
students sniffed, the dogs alerted to approximately 50 students, but only 17 of those possessed
illegal drugs or alcohol-an accuracy rate of only 34%. 475 F. Supp. at 1017. Following the dog's
alert to the plaintiff, school officials ordered her to empty her pockets. Id. Because the dog
continued to alert to her, the plaintiff was subjected to a strip search conducted by female nurses.
Id. The nurses found no drugs in the plaintiffs possession. Id. The dog had reacted to the scent
of the plaintiffs dog that was in heat and with which the plaintiff had played that morning. Id.
See also United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(noting that dogs alert to money alone about 10% of the time and citing studies indicating that as
much as 97% of all bills in circulation are contaminated by cocaine).
As LaFave notes, these inaccuracies may bear more on whether the dog sniff alone constitutes
probable cause to conduct a full-blown search than whether the canine-sniff procedure is itself a
search. LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 2.2(f) at 372 (cited in note 11). However, the inaccuracy
of a dog's sniff also raises the question as to whether the sniff can reveal private facts aside from
the presence of contraband. For example, dogs might alert to the presence of cat hairs on an
individual's clothes packed in luggage, or a dog in heat within an apartment, or the presence of
rodents in a garage or storage facility.
142. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469. But see United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that entry into a sleeper compartment to conduct a sniff is a search requiring reasonable
suspicion). The Whitehead court did not clarify which activity the Fourth Amendment restrainsthe use of the dog or the entry into the compartment.
143. United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1992). This case also may apply to
sniffs of checked and carry-on luggage aboard airplanes.
144. United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1993); Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School
Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
145. United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1990). If the stop of the
vehicle is a pretext for the sniff, then the seizure of the vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Morales-Zamora,974 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Amendment does not constrain sniffs of locked storage facilities,'1
garages, 47 warehouses, 14 and, perhaps, apartment doors when the
dog is sniffing from an alley or other area open to the public. 49 Cases
involving sniffs of people are scarce, and at least twice the Supreme
Court has declined the opportunity to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment limits this practice. 150 Thus, whether the Fourth
Amendment provides constraints on the sniff of a person or objects
within his possession remains an open question. 15 The logic of Place
and Jacobsen, however, certainly seems to apply equally to canine
sniffs of people.52
Under this broad conception, a canine sniff does not constitute
a search if the dog and officer are lawfully situated during its occurrence. By foreclosing any Fourth Amendment scrutiny of canine
sniffs, these courts make no inquiry as to the reasonableness of using
the dogs.'5 Instead, the courts focus on the fact that a canine sniff
reveals no legitimately private information about an individual. By
narrowly defining a search in this manner, the courts cede wide
146. States v. Slowikowski, 307 Or. 19, 761 P.2d 1315, 1320 (1988). In Slowikowski, the dog
handlers were using the storage facility as a training area. The police had placed drugs in one
locker, but the dogs also alerted to the defendant's. Id.
147. United States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1990).
148. United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1993).
149. See id. at 638 (criticizing United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985)). See
also note 138 and accompanying text (discussing how Thomas varied from the reasoning in Place
and Jacobsen).
150. Compare Horton v. Goosecreak Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983) (holding canine sniffs of students by school officials to be searches)
with Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981)
(holding that canine sniffs of students by school officials do not constitute searches). The Coures
language in Place indicates that part of its reasoning lay in the belief that the sniff of luggage at
issue did not subject the defendant to any embarassment, harassment, or public accusation of
guilt. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). As one commentator noted, however, the
sniff of a person is highly embarrassing, indiscriminate, and harrowing at best. Arnold M. Loewy,
The FourthAmendment as a Device for Protectingthe Innocent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229, 1246-47
(1983).
151. See United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 1385 (8th Cir. 1990) (reserving decision as
to whether a canine sniff of a person amounts to a search).
152. If an individual has no expectation that his criminality will come to the attention of
authorities, that the sniff is of a person rather than checked luggage should not matter because,
arguably, no other private facts about the individual have been revealed. But see note 105
(discussing how the Horton court shifted logic when analyzing sniffs of lockers and students).
This analysis illustrates the inherent balancing that occurs before a court will classify a procedure
as a search.
153. According to Judge Pregerson, this all-or-nothing approach to defining searches suffers
from three defects. First, it eliminates the judiciary's responsibility for reviewing limited
invasions of Fourth Amendment interests. Second, it overlooks circumstances indicating that
some intermediate level of suspicion may exist to regulate limited intrusions on these interests
while assuring officers adequate flexibility in detecting crime. Third, this approach forfeits
Fourth Amendment protection against arbitrary policy activity. United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d
1289, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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authority to the police to use drug-sniffing dogs at their discretion,
with or without valid suspicion. Thus, the federal courts have left
open the possibility that the dogs will be used in a harrassing or menacing manner.1 5
B. The State Approach
Although several questions remain open regarding the
1 55
applicability of the federal constitution to canine sniffs, some states
have found limits on the use of dog sniffs within their state constitutions' search and seizure clauses. These decisions allow the courts to
retain some control over this practice to prevent arbitrary police
action. 15 These states have agreed that the warrant and probable
cause requirements should not apply to canine sniffs, but have found
the Supreme Court's decision to leave canine sniffs beyond the scope of
judicial review under the Fourth Amendment unsatisfactory. This
subpart surveys how these states have resolved this inherent tension
by fashioning a limited exception to the probable cause requirement.

154. Arguably, the fact that the detention of the suspect may be conducted only if police have
reasonable suspicion largely circumscribes the ability to use a dog for harassment. See Place, 462
U.S. at 706. Moreover, not every police officer may have a canine unit. Therefore, if an officer
wishes to subject an individual or object to a sniff, he must have valid cause to detain that person
or object until the dog arrives. This view ignores the possibility that the police can conduct a sniff
without a seizure. For example, no seizure occurs when police officers move personal belongings
in the passenger compartment of a bus to expose them to a dog's nose. See Harvey, 961 F.2d at
1364. For a-more complete discussion of practical limits on police discretion to use canine sniffs,
see Part IV.C.3.
155. This Note focuses on New Hampshire, Colorado, and Pennsylvania, but other states also
have recognized that canine sniffs fall within the purview of their state constitutions. For
example, New York recognized that a canine sniff of a defendant's apartment constituted a
search. People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (1990). But see People v. Offen, 78 N.Y.2d
1089, 585 N.E.2d 370, 372 (1991) (declining to decide whether a canine sniff of a package in the
custody of a parcel service constituted a search under the New York Constitution). In addition,
an- appellate court in Washington left open the possibility that a canine sniff may constitute a
search under its state constitution. State v. Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724, 723 P.2d 28, 31 (1986)
(holding that a canine sniff of a safe-deposit box is not a search under the Washington
Constitution, but noting that the inquiry as to what constitutes a search for state constitutional
purposes differs from Place and Jacobsen). In addition, an Alaska appellate court held that a sniff
of luggage at an airport constitutes a minimally intrusive search, requiring only reasonable
suspicion that the luggage contains drugs. Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1311 (Alaska Ct. App.

1985).
156. Other state courts have declined to find that dog sniffs are searches under their state
constitutions. See, for example, People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d. 335, 644 P.2d. 810 (1982). In
State v. Snitkin, 67 Hawaii 168, 681 P.2d 980 (1984), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a
canine sniff was not a search under its state constitution, but then held that courts must examine
the reasonableness of the dog's use in each circumstance. Id. at 983.
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1. Colorado
In People v. Unruh,1' 7 the Colorado Supreme Court made its
first foray into this issue, holding that a canine sniff amounted to a
search under its state constitution. 158 The Unruh court upheld the
sniff of a safe, which had been stolen from the defendant's home, but
which the police had recovered and held in custody.5 9 The court's
analysis resembled the Second Circuit's analysis in United States v.
Thomas60 because it focused on the area subject to the search rather
than its object. While the Unruh court conceded that dog sniffs
amount to less of an intrusion than other, more indiscriminate
searches, the court recognized that a canine sniff reveals concealed
objects not readily apparent to human senses,'6 ' with or without
enhancing devices.162 The Unruh court concluded that the sniff of the
defendant's safe amounted to a search because it disclosed the contents of a container in which the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

63

Having concluded that the sniff amounted to a search under
the Colorado Constitution, the court upheld the search based on a

157. 713 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1986) (en bane).
158. Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution provides: 'The people shall be secure
in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures.' Colo.
Const., Art. II, § 7.
159. Indeed, Unruh involved a very unique set of facts. Police observed burglars with the
defendant's safe, which they had stolen from the defendant's basement. One burglar told the
police that he believed the safe contained money or drugs. Another officer located the house
where the robbery took place and proceeded to search its basement. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 372.
Presumably, an exigent circumstance existed warranting the search because the house had been
the scene of a recent crime. The officer determined that the safe had been removed from the wall
of a closet in the defendant's basement. In the closet, the officer also found a triple-beam scale,
mirror, two teaspoons, and a playing card all bearing a white residue. Id. at 372.
160. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
161. No search occurs in which the scent of narcotics is discoverable by human senses.
Instead, the sniff is analyzed as if the narcotics were in plain view of human senses. See United
States v. Lovell, 849 F.2d 910,913 (5th Cir. 1988).
162. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 377 (quoting United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir.
1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring)). Judge Mansfield recognized: "The important factor is not the
relative accuracy of the sensing device but the fact of the intrusion into a closed area otherwise
hidden from human view, which is the hallmark of any search." Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 464
(Mansfield, J., concurring).
163. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 377-78. The court distinguished Place because people at airports
may expect some inspection of their luggage for safety reasons. Id. By comparison, the defendant
in Unruh never expected police to gain custody of or search the safe that he kept hidden in his
basement. Id. at 378. This distinction ignores Place's reasoning that the defendant had an
expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage, but the canine sniff did not intrude into his
privacy because the sniff revealed the presence or absence of contraband only. See Place, 462
U.S. at 707.
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reasonable suspicion standard.164 This approach represents a substantial departure from the reasoning of Terry and Hicks. In Terry, the
Court justified its use of this lower standard of suspicion in reviewing
a frisk for weapons because of the need to protect the safety of the
officer who must make a quick decision whether to frisk.165 In a pure
investigatory context, in which the need to protect safety does not
exist, Hicks clarified that the Fourth Amendment requires probable
cause to validate a search. 166
While the Unruh court verbally
approved of this standard,167 it adopted the balancing approach under
Terry without much discussion as to why the probable cause and
warrant requirements did not apply.168 The court simply concluded
that the balance between public and private interests in this case
required a reasonable suspicion standard. 6 9 It did not recognize any
limits on the scope of this exception to the probable cause
requirement.
Since Unruh, the Colorado Supreme Court has remained
170
sharply divided regarding the scope of the canine sniff exception.
164. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379. Specifically, the court recognized the government's compelling
interest in suppressing the use and distribution of illegal drugs and the minimal intrusion
accorded by a canine sniff. Id.
165. Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968).
166. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1987). See also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting that searches conducted outside the warrant process and
unsupported by probable cause are per se unreasonable).
167. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 378. Specifically the court stated that "warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable ....
Moreover, even in the limited types of situations in which a
warrantless search or seizure might be justified, the requirement of probable cause to obtain a
warrant has generally been retained." Id.
168. Id. at 378-79. Two key points distinguish the canine sniff in Unruh from the frisk in
Terry. First, the frisk authorized in Terry was predicated on the overriding need to protect the
safety of the officer and those around him. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-29. The police conducted the
sniff in Unruh for the sole purpose of discovering evidence. See Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379. Second,
the lower suspicion standard in Terry was predicated on the need for necessarily swift action by
the officer in disarming a suspect. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. In Unruh, the police had possession of
the safe and ample time to procure prior judicial approval for the sniff. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 373
(noting that following the sniff, the officers applied for a warrant to search the safe).
169. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379. Specifically, the court recognized the government's compelling
interest in suppressing the use and distribution of illegal drugs and the minimal intrusion
accorded by a canine sniff. Id.
170. In People v. Wieser, 796 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1990), the court upheld a canine sniff of a locker
at a storage facility. Three judges believed that the sniff did not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Colorado Constitution and fell outside the scope of judicial scrutiny because it
disclosed only the presence or absence of contraband. Id. at 985. Three judges believed that the
sniff did constitute a search, but the search in the instant case complied with the Colorado
Constitution because the police had reasonable suspicion that the locker contained drugs. Id. at
987-88 (Mullarkey, J., concurring in the judgment). The dissenting judge agreed that the sniff
amounted to a search, but did not believe that the police had proven reasonable suspicion to
justify the sniff. Id. at 992 (Quinn, J., dissenting).
In People v. Boylan, 854 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1993), the court upheld the sniff of a Federal Express
package at the Federal Express office because the police had reasonable suspicion that the
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The court has justified the use of a reasonable suspicion standard,
rather than the traditional probable cause requirement, because the
sniff is less intrusive than other searching methods. 171 Yet, the court
has provided little insight into the scope and implications of creating a
balancing test for these minimally intrusive searches.
2. New Hampshire
In State v. Pellicci,172 the New Hampshire Supreme Court took
an approach similar to the Colorado court's analysis, applying a reasonable suspicion standard for a canine sniff of the defendant's automobile. The court upheld the stop and sniff of the defendant's automobile based on reasonable suspicion that he was in the process of a
drug sale. 173 In its analysis, the Pelliccicourt first determined that the
sniff represented a prying into a hidden place in search of a concealed
item, thereby amounting to a search under the New Hampshire Constitution. 74 The court then examined whether the warrant or probable cause requirements applied to the canine sniff of a stopped vehicle. The court found that the canine sniff was, indeed, a mere minimal intrusion. 175 It concluded that when the intrusion on individual
interests is sufficiently small and the government's interest is sufficiently great, a reasonable suspicion standard is appropriate. 176
In his majority opinion, Justice Johnson noted several reasons
for this departure from the probable cause and warrant requirements.
package contained drugs. The same issues that divided the Wieser court split the Boylan court.
The majority believed that the sniff constituted a search justifiable on a reasonable suspicion
standard, id. at 810-12, while the concurring justices believed the sniff did not amount to a search
within the scope of the Colorado Constitution. Id. at 813-14 (Vollack, J., specially concurring in
the result).
171. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379.
172. 133 N.H. 523,580 A.2d 710 (1990).
173. Id. at 711-12.
174. Id. at 716. Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides: "Every
subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his
houses, his papers, and all his possessions." N.H. Const. Pt. I, Art. 19. The New Hampshire court
never adopted or rejected the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis used by the post-Katz
Supreme Court; rather, the New Hampshire court used a test for a search akin to the one used by
the Katz majority, asking whether the procedure reveals the presence of something concealed
from public view. Pellicci,580 A.2d at 716.
175. Id. at 715-16 (quoting LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure §2.2(f) at 375 (cited in note 11)).
176. Pellici, 580 A.2d at 717. Thus, the court specifically held "that where, as here, a canine
sniff. (1) is part of an investigative stop based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
imminent criminal activity involving controlled substances; (2) is employed to search a vehicle; (3)
in no way increases the time necessary for the moderate questioning our prior cases allow; and (4)
is itself based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the property searched contains
controlled substances, it satisfies the requirements of" the state constitution's search and seizure
clause. Id.
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He first noted that although the procedure is decidedly less intrusive
than other police investigatory tools, the sniff still constitutes a search
that should be subject to constitutional scrutiny.1 77 He then added
that because the sniff procedure is so distinguishable from other
searching activities governed by the probable cause requirement, the
application of Terry's balancing formula to canine sniffs would not
erode the probable cause standard.,,, The Pellicci majority believed
that forcing police to provide some articulable reasons for the sniff
would prevent the court from abdicating its constitutional
responsibility to review investigatory searches. 179
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Brock further analyzed
the analogy between a canine sniff and the limited search for weapons
in Terry. Justice Brock observed that the historical purpose of the
search and seizure clause and the probable cause requirement'8 was
1 81
to protect individuals from arbitrary intrusions by the state.
According to Justice Brock, Terry recognized a type of government
intrusion that constitutes a search, but falls outside the traditional
mechanics of a warrant and probable cause. 18 2 Under Justice Brock's

conception, the Terry Court recognized a frisk to be unique because of
the limited scope of discovery and brief intrusion on personal security.a1 This technique did not constitute a full search and, therefore,
fell within a category that did not warrant application of the probable
cause requirement.'" Justice Brock believed that a canine sniff would
fit equally well into this category of minimally intrusive searches,
valid under reasonable suspicion.1 A sniff by a dog, according to
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 717-18.
Id. at 717 (quoting LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure §2.2(f) at 375 (cited in note 11)).
Pellici,580 A.2d at 718.
Justice Brock explained these mandates as follows:
From an historical perspective, the most faithful interpretation of the fourth
amendment and part I, article 19 would require that there be a formal warrant for any
search to be reasonable.
Therefore, all warrantless searches would be per se
unreasonable. That may have been the framers' original intent, but this court has not
adhered to such a strict interpretation of search and seizure provisions. Instead, like the
fourth amendment, part I, article 19 has been extended to deal with exigent
circumstances by creating limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. All warrantless
searches remain per se unreasonable unless they come within one of these few exceptions.
Although each of the ... exceptions negates the need for a prerequisite search warrant,
the State must still satisfy the Warrant Clause by showing that its actions were supported
by probable cause.
Id. at 720-21 (Brock, C.J., specially concurring).
181. Id. at 721.
182. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
183. Pellici, 580 A.2d at 722.
184. Id.
185. Id. Specifically, Justice Brock noted that "[1]ike a frisk, [a canine snif] ... is uniquely
limited in both discovery and intrusiveness and it does not rise to a level necessary to trigger the
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Justice Brock, constituted an intrusion inflicting potential indignity to
the subject and causing popular resentment of the government, which
the framers of the state constitution intended to prevent.'
He
recognized that this approach represented a significant departure
from Terry's reliance on exigent circumstances and danger to support
the frisk. Nonetheless, he believed that the sniff was uniquely limited
in scope as to both its object and its intrusiveness, thereby offsetting
7
any lack of exigency occasioned by Terry.'
In his dissent, Justice Batchelder challenged the assertion that
a canine sniff fit within the scope of the Terry exception. He believed
that the sniff at issue went beyond the limited intrusion on Fourth
Amendment rights approved in Terry because Terry only authorized a
limited search for weapons in exigent circumstances.'M
Justice
Batchelder observed that Terry had rejected precisely the analysis
adopted by the Pellicci court. 189 He had concerns that by excusing
canine sniffs from the probable cause and warrant requirements, the
court was creating an exception that would swallow the Warrant
Clause in favor of a more flexible reasonableness standard.' 90
Moreover, he believed that the court should not engage in a process
diluting individual rights simply to comply with law enforcement
needs.'9 ' The warrant and probable cause mandates, according to
Justice Batchelder, stood as a bulwark against this erosion.

warrant requirement. Yet, it is a search within the plain meaning of the word. To have one's
person or possession 'sniffed' by a dog is certainly an affront to personal dignity, and the fact that
discovery is limited does not make it any less so." Id.
186. Id. Although Justice Brock recognized that this approach represented a significant
departure from Terry because Terry was based largely on the danger supporting the frisk, he
nonetheless believed that the sniff was uniquely limited in scope so as to offset any lack of
exigency occasioned by Terry. Id. The Supreme Court, however, had rejected similar analyses.
See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (noting that a
frisk, not limited in scope to the disarmament of the suspect, violates the Fourth Amendment if
not supported by probable cause).
187. Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 722.
188. Id. at 727 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 727. Specifically, the Terry Court noted that a frisk could not be justified by any
need to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29). The
Supreme Court had rejected similar analyses in other contexts as well. See, for example, Hicks,
480 U.S. at 328.
190. Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 728. Justice Batchelder feared that applying a Terry analysis to
Pellicci's facts would represent 'the first step into a constitutional thicket from which our
extrication will be neither supportive of civil rights nor helpful to the difficult task of law
enforcement." Id. at 729.
191. Id. at 730 (noting that the court "must not allow our zeal for effective law enforcement
to blind us to the peril to our free society that lies in ... [the] disregard of the protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment") (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 513 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the result)).
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The Pelliccicourt's debate focused on whether the court should
abandon the warrant and probable cause requirements in favor of a
balancing test for canine sniffs. The majority seemed willing to use a
reasonable suspicion standard to balance individual interests in not
being sniffed against the police interest in conducting the sniff. The
majority recognized that its state search and seizure clause should
regulate all degrees of intrusiveness of police searches. 192 The dissent
found that this rule would undermine the guarantees provided by the
state constitution's search and seizure clause in areas beyond canine
sniffs.
3. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's Supreme Court tackled these issues in
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 93 in which the court upheld the canine
sniff of a storage locker under the state constitution 94 based on
reasonable suspicion that it contained drugs.195 In deciding whether to
apply Terry's reasonable suspicion standard to canine sniffs, the court
recognized that it should use this approach only in the most limited
circumstances.196 The Johnston court observed that the probable
cause requirement functions as the appropriate balance between
personal privacy and police objectives. It further noted that the protections intended by the framers could vanish too easily in a broad
application of a more lenient balancing rule.197 The Court's main
concern with exempting canine sniffs from constitutional scrutiny was
that the police may use the dogs arbitrarily, with no requirement of
any suspicion and no prospect of judicial inquiry into the reasonable93
ness of the officer's conduct.
Having framed both sides of the debate, the court stated that
the issue was not whether a search occurred, but whether the search
192. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15, 17.
193. 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74 (1987). The Pennsylvania court also found that a canine sniff
constituted a search under its state constitution because the sniff revealed a concealed object that
the defendant had expected to keep private. Id. at 76.
194. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: 'The people shall be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing
them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
subscribed to by the afflant." Pa. Const., Art. I, § 8.
195. A drug enforcement agent ordered the sniff of the defendant's locker after observing the
defendant carrying packages that appeared to be bales of marijuana from the facility. Johnston,
530 A.2d at 75.
196. Id. at 77.
197. Id. at 77-78 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 718-19 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
198. Johnston, 530 A.2d at 78.
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that did occur implicated the usual warrant and probable cause requirements necessary in police investigatory searches. 99 The court
then used a balancing test to determine whether the canine sniff at
issue necessarily triggered the traditional warrant and probable cause
requirements. 200 The court narrowed its inquiry to whether some
middle ground of reasonableness existed between the traditional
probable cause standard and no standard at all. 20 ' By applying an
intermediate standard of reasonableness, the court subjected canine
sniffs to some constitutional restraints, thereby preventing police from
using them in a random, harassing, and unprincipled fashion.202 This
standard also would not destroy the sniffs effectiveness by imposing
the same constitutional limitations applicable to broader searches. 2°3
The court struck the balance as follows: on one side, the probable
cause requirement would eviscerate the utility of these sniffs, while on
the other, random and suspicionless use of drug-sniffing dogs, or any
2 4
other crime detection device, would destroy many societal freedoms. 0
The court concluded that a Fourth Amendment middle ground did
exist to accommodate both of these needs.
Thus, the debate in establishing a middle ground of reasonableness for canine sniffs resembles the debate in establishing a flexible probable cause requirement in the housing inspection cases. 20 5
The same three issues are present in both contexts. First, the
Johnston court agreed with the Place Court that a canine sniff is
substantially less intrusive than a traditional search.2 0)6 Second, the
Johnston court observed that the use of dogs is a valuable surveillance
technique.207 Third, the court recognized that a probable cause
requirement would impose too great a burden on police and
undermine the usefulness of canine sniffs.208 Although not expressly

199. Id. at 79.
200. Id. The Johnston court found this balancing approach preferable to the approach taken

in Place. The Johnston court viewed Place's conclusion that a canine sniff did not constitute a
search within the Fourth Amendment, despite the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy
in his luggage, as the result of a balancing test. Id. at 77. According to the Johnston court, Place
weighed the individual's expectation of privacy and interest in freedom from police searches
against the narrow intrusiveness that a canine sniff entails in carrying out drug enforcment. Id.

The Johnston court believed that this balancing goes not to the question of whether a search
occurred, but to the reasonableness of the search. Id. at 79.
201. Id. (quoting LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure §2.1(e) at 315 (cited in note 11)).

202. Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79.
203. Id.

204. Id.
205. See text accompanying notes 30-49.

206. Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79.
207. Id. (quoting LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure § 21 at 315 (cited in note 11)).
208. Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79.
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stated by the Place Court, its decision implies that it would have
agreed with these three sentiments.2 09 Johnston and Place, however,
differed on the issue of whether constitutional safeguards were
necessary to limit the discretion of the officer in the field. Implicit in
this consideration is a decision that the search and seizure clause
protects interests beyond the privacy interests protected by the
probable cause requirement. While the Johnston court found the need
for judicial oversight of canine sniff procedures to prevent arbitrary
police conduct, the Place Court focused on the limited privacy interests
at stake and found concerns about unreasonable police behavior
irrelevant.21o
Pennsylvania limited the scope of its canine sniff exception to
2
the probable cause requirement in Commonwealth v. Martin.
11 In
Martin, the police suspected the defendant and his companions of
consummating a drug transaction and conducted a canine sniff of the
satchel the defendant was carrying. 2 2 The Martin court found that
the satchel constituted part of the defendant's person, as if it were a
2 13
wallet or jacket, and held that the sniff required probable cause.
The court reasoned that a canine sniff of a person implicated different
interests than a sniff of property and constituted a significant intrusion into personal privacy interests. 2 4 Thus, a sniff of a person could
not qualify for the lesser suspicion standard established in Johnston.2 15
This decision, in effect, will eliminate the use of canines to sniff
people and objects they may be carrying. If the police had probable
cause, then they could have arrested the defendant lawfully and
subjected his satchel and his person to a full search incident to
arrest. 216 By requiring probable cause for a sniff of a person, the court
eliminated the value of the canine sniff technique as an effective law
enforcement tool. At the same time, the value of the sniff as a limited
intrusion will be lost because police, armed with probable cause, will
use more intrusive methods to discover exactly what they would have
209. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1993). The Place Court stressed that the
sniff did not disclose any private information about the defendant that other searching techniques
might reveal. Id. Because a sniff detects criminality without detecting private information, it is a
perfect crime detection tool. It detects crime without any embarassment or inconvenience to the
innocent subject of the search. Thus, the Court found that a sniff serves as a highly useful tool in
narcotics detection, and a probable cause standard, typically required for more intrusive searches,
would prove unworkable. Id.
210. See id.
211. 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993).
212. Id. at 558.
213. Id. at 560.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 565 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
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found with a less intrusive search.2 17 Martin's holding thus may be
interpreted as a belief that canine sniffs of people are so embarassing
2
that they should not occur at all. 1a
IV. FINDING SOME MIDDLE GROUND OF REASONABLENESS
The use of a reasonable suspicion standard to analyze canine
sniffs under state search and seizure clauses represents a significant
departure from Federal Fourth Amendment case law. Terry, Katz,
and Hicks all stand for the proposition that to be reasonable, a pure
investigatory search requires probable cause. 219
Some states,
however, have extended Terry's balancing rationale to canine sniffs.

These holdings raise the specter of a general reasonableness standard
in the pure investigatory search context without reference to the
probable cause requirement. If a reasonable suspicion standard is
sufficient for canine sniffs, courts potentially may reclassify those pure

investigatory activities, considered beyond the scope of the Fourth

suspicion.22 0
requiring reasonable
Amendment, as searches
Nonetheless, courts have been reluctant to expand a sliding-scale
approach to reasonableness in this area. In addition, a number of

commentators disagree about whether this broad reasonableness
standard is valuable at all.221
217. As the dissent noted, "[i]f the dog sniff indicates the presence of drugs, then nothing has
been gained because the police already had probable cause to believe that the satchel contained

contraband. However, if the dog sniff does not indicate the presence of drugs, then the police are
in a quandary.... It stands to reason that the police will not use a technique, which they are not
required to use, that could only work to undermine their law enforcement efforts." Id.
218. See id. at 563 (Cappy, J., concurring) (noting that no citizen should be subjected to a
governmental intrusion of this nature absent probable cause). Similarly, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1967), precluded frisks of individuals absent reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed.
Id. at 29. Because no overriding safety concern justifies a canine sniff, police must have probable
cause to believe that the defendant possesses narcotics before exposing him to a dog. Martin, 626
A.2d at 561.
219. See Part IIA.1 and Part II.C.
220. This standard potentially could apply to searches of curbside garbage, see California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988), searches of open fields, see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 173 (1984), overflights, see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989); and telephone pen
registers, see Smith v. Maryland,442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
221. See Sundby, 72 Minn. L. Rev. at 384-85 (cited in note 20) (criticizing a balancing
approach); Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 390-95 (cited in note 3) (entertaining and, then,
rejecting the sliding-scale approach). But see Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth
Amendment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 68-75 (1991) (adopting a sliding-scale, balancing model); Silas J.
Wasserstrom and Louis Michael Seidman, The FourthAmendment as Constitutional Theory, 77
Georgetown L. J. 19, 44-50 (1988) (favoring a balancing approach); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models
of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468, 1471-72 (1985) (urging that the Court should
either adopt a balancing test or a warrant requirement for all searches and seizures but should
not maintain the current amalgamation of the two models).
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This Part examines the disadvantages of a strict probable
cause requirement, as well as the advantages and weaknesses of a
general reasonableness approach as an alternative to a probable cause
requirement. 222 This Part concludes that federal and state courts'2
should apply a limited, narrowly construed reasonable suspicion
standard, not based on a balancing formula, to minimally intrusive
searches like canine sniffs.
This rule would provide some
constitutional limits on minimally intrusive police searching activities
without undermining their efficacy or usefulness.
A. Disadvantagesof a Strict ProbableCause Requirement
A strict probable cause requirement for pure investigatory
searches transforms the Fourth Amendment into a monolith. When
the Amendment restricts police actions, it subjects each of them to
the same extensive restrictions imposed on physical entries into dwellings. 22 4 Thus, when a court concludes that a pure investigatory activ-

ity constitutes a search, the probable cause requirement applies. 25
This all-or-nothing approach puts substantial pressure on the process
of defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment.226 As noted in Part
II.A, this pressure has led the Court to exclude a significant amount of
police investigative activity from the scope of the Amendment.27
Moreover, wherever one draws the line as to which situations require
probable cause, other similar cases lie quite close on the opposite side
of the line.228 This line-drawing creates enormous consequences as to
how police conduct certain activities out of proportion to the differences in intrusiveness between the cases lying near each other on
either side. 229 In the pure investigatory context, the probable cause

222. A reasonableness or sliding-scale model of the Fourth Amendment would allow police
officers to conduct more intrusive activities when they have greater degrees of suspicion. The
rationale is that the more intrusive an investigative technique is, the more assured society wants
to be that the procedure will result in the discovery of probative evidence before police are
allowed to undertake that activity. Slobogin, 39 UCLA L. Rev. at 49-50 (cited in note 221). This
proportionality approach is reflected, to some degree, in the balancing analysis undertaken by the
Court in the noncriminal context. See, for example, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-43
(1985).
223. Absent a Supreme Court decision changing its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
see Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328-29, state courts should interpret state search and seizure clauses to
provide for a limited reasonable suspicion standard for pure investigatory searches.
224. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 388 (cited in note 3).
225. See Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 723 (Brock, C.J., specially concurring) (observing that the Place
majority held that the dog sniff was not a search within the Fourth Amendment because to hold
otherwise would require the police to have probable cause before using the dog).
226. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 388 (cited in note 3).
227. See notes 21-29 and 99-108 and accompanying text.
228. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 388 (cited in note 3).
229. Id.
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requirement effectively creates a regime in which every procedure
that is intrusive up to the point that courts mandate probable cause
falls beyond the scope of the Amendment's protection altogether.
Once excluded from the Amendment's requirements, police may conduct a searching procedure in a random and wanton manner. This
regime reverses the Fourth Amendment inquiry: rather than determining whether the searching activity at issue requires probable
cause to be reasonable, the courts implicitly determine whether the
activity requires probable cause so as to constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The focus on probable cause also distracts courts from addressing substantive questions and policies underlying the Amendment.20
In the typical criminal case under the Fourth Amendment, a court
focuses on whether a procedure intrudes on a defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy to determine whether the searching activity
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.231 Generally, the
court weighs the intrusiveness of the challenged procedure against its
benefits to determine which standard of reasonableness to apply.22 A
probable cause requirement distorts the balance by fixing the standard of reasonableness at probable cause.m Thus, only those activities that are so intrusive as to require probable cause quaify as
searches under the Fourth Amendment. Virtually all other less
intrusive activities require no standard of suspicion at all. 234
If the rationale behind the Amendment is to balance competent
law enforcement and personal privacy effectively,25 then the Court
should conduct this balancing explicitly. Moreover, requiring probable
cause for every pure investigatory search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is a blunt instrument for enforcing that balance.
When compared to Fourth Amendment analysis in the criminal
investigatory seizure context, the reliance on a probable cause requirement in the pure investigatory search context is anomalous. The
Court has recognized two types of seizures under the Fourth
Amendment: stops and arrests. Stops require a lesser standard of
230. Wasserstrom and Seidman, 77 Georgetown L. J. at 30 (cited in note 221).
231. See, for example, Californiav. Greenwood,486 U.S. 35,39 (1988).
232. See Stuntz, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 556 (cited in note 66).
233. See id. at 557-58 n.22.
234. See text accompanying notes 99-108.
235. Wasserstrom and Seidman, 77 Georgetown L. J. at 30 (cited in note 221). This belief is
subject to debate, however, because while the historical facts leading up to the Amendment's
enactment are clear, the intent of the framers is not. See Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 401
(cited in note 3) (noting that "history is a standoff' in that it does not suggest or seem to require a
narrow or fixed interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's broad language).
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suspicion than arrests, which require probable cause.2 6 This regime
reflects the reality that police officers need an escalating set of flexible
responses, graduated in relation to the level of suspicion they possess. 1 7 At the same time, the lower suspicion standard prevents the
court from also insulating from constitutional scrutiny the initial
stages of investigatory conduct and contact between the officer and
citizen. 2 8 By comparison, the probable cause requirement's all-ornothing approach obscures from constitutional scrutiny police activities that otherwise would warrant restrictions to ensure reasonableness.2 9
By excluding many searching techniques from the purview of
the Fourth Amendment, this all-or-nothing approach allows police to
conduct these activities arbitrarily. Emerging technologies make
modern police practices increasingly discrete, limited in scope and
intrusiveness. 240 By placing minimally intrusive searching procedures
beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the Court has foreclosed
judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the officer's conduct and
cedes all discretion to the officer in the field. 241 If the Fourth
Amendment exists to protect citizens from arbitrary police intrusions
into personal privacy and security,24 however, the courts should take
some role in reviewing those police actions that intrude, albeit minimally, on individual privacy and security. A standard below probable
cause would affirm most uses of these minimally intrusive techniques. 24 However, it also would allow the courts to check egregious
abuses of police authority and assure that police searching conduct is
reasonable.
B. Advantages and Disadvantagesof a Sliding-ScaleModel
A reasonableness regime is one method often proposed to resolve the problems inherent in strict application of the probable cause
requirement. Rather than asking whether the procedure at issue
requires probable cause, the court asks whether the specific procedure
236. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,209 (1979).
237. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968).
238. Id. at 17.
239. Id.
240. See generally David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 Minn.
L. Rev. 563, 563-78 (1990) (discussing the Fourth Amendment problems posed by the limited
nature of sense-enhanced searches).
241. United States v. Jacobsen,466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,661 (1979).
243. See Stuntz, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 554 (cited in note 66) (noting that the Court's use of a
reasonableness standard below probable cause resembles rational basis review).
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Under a pure sliding-scale model, 24 the level of

intrusiveness of the procedure governs the level of suspicion the
government must obtain before conducting the search. 24- Through this
necessary balancing, courts could come to grips with the substantive
choices between the competing values at stake.2 4 This approach
requires a court to weigh the intrusiveness of a specific procedure
against the government's need to search on a case-by-case basis. It
also encourages more stringent judicial review by allowing courts to
balance the competing considerations throughout each level of the
judicial process. 247 In contrast, a probable cause regime gives broad
discretion to magistrates who make the initial probable cause
assessment. 24 In addition, a reasonableness approach forces courts to
249
address explicitly the factors they weigh in their decision.
A reasonableness approach provides greater flexibility in addressing the spectrum between police contact and individual security.
It recognizes that modern police work is no longer the blunt, general
search conducted by British customs officers; rather, police now have a
wide range of technologically advanced options that allow them to
investigate crimes in a more discrete and less intrusive manner.250 In

this respect, Justice Brennan's fear that technology may override the
Fourth Amendment's limits 251 would not come to fruition because the
balancing approach applies to the full range of police investigatory
conduct.
A general reasonableness standard also would allow courts to
broaden the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Judges could classify a
procedure as a search more readily if they could apply a standard of
suspicion lower than probable cause and uphold the continued vitality

244. Pure balancing refers to a situation in which the court would inquire solely into the
reasonableness of the procedure without reference to the warrant or probable cause
requirements.
245. Slobogin, 39 UCLA L. Rev. at 68 (cited in note 221).
246. Wasserstrom and Seidman, 77 Georgetown L. Rev. at 44 (cited in note 221).
247. Id. at 46-47.
248. Slobogin, 39 UCLA L. Rev. at 72-73 (cited in note 221).
249. Id. at 73.
250. See William M. Fitzgerald, Comment, The Constitutionalityof the Canine Sniff Search:
From Katz to Dogs, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 57, 57 (1984). But see Steinberg, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 568-78
(cited in note 240). Professor Steinberg argues that the view of sense-enhanced searches as less
intrusive is incorrect. Because the police often may conduct these searches without alerting the
suspect that he is under investigation, sense-enhanced searches encourage police misconduct. Id.
at 569. Police officers can conduct sense-enhanced searches from a distance of safety, and this
action gives rise to no tangible threat of civil suit. Thus, police may believe that they can conduct
broad, ongoing, and unfocused investigations of these types with impunity. Id. at 578.
251. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of the procedure. 25 2 A search would not be tied to notions of probable
cause. The inquiry into whether a Fourth Amendment search
occurred would shift to whether the investigatory procedure at issue
should be subject to some judicial control or whether the courts should
allow the police to use the procedure in a dragnet and unprincipled
fashion.

25

The reasonableness approach is not without its problems, however. The pitfalls stem from the same fact that a balancing approach
is inherently a nonstandard. Thus, adoption of a sliding-scale
approach in the pure investigatory context ultimately would lead to
broad judicial deference to police discretion, the very danger against
which the Fourth Amendment protects.
First, although a general reasonableness approach may
broaden the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protections, it
ultimately would dilute those protections. Courts would evaluate each
case on an individual basis, and judges, already worried about the
exclusionary rule's effect on ultimate truthfinding, 2 would be inclined
to approve searches and seizures as reasonable for fear of losing
evidence and freeing a guilty defendant. 25 5 The appellate judges would

In
defer to the judges who, in turn, would defer to the police.2
257
practice, use of the balancing standard, with rare exception,
arguably has resulted in an undervaluing of individual rights and an

252. Arguably, the Court achieves the same result by calling a police procedure a search in
one factual situation but a nonsearch in another. As long as this analysis occurs, however, it
should occur explicitly to provide guidance for lower courts to conduct similar analyses and better
evaluate the Fourth Amendment interests at stake.
253. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 393 (cited in note 3). See also LaFave, 1 Search and
Seizure § 2.1(e) at 315 (cited in note 11).
254. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (discussing the substantial costs
of the exclusionary rule).
255. Historically this fear has led to a lukewarm reception of the exclusionary rule by judges.
See, for example, People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (characterizing the
exclusionary rule as permitting the criminal to go free because the constable blundered).
256. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 394 (cited in note 3). In its amicus curiae brief in Terry,
the NAACP stated:
The rub is simply that, in the real world, there is no third state; the reasonableness
theory is paper thin; there can be no compromise. Probable cause is the objective, solid
and efficacious method of reasoning-itself highly approximative and adaptable, but
withal tenacious in its insistence that common judgement and detatched, autonomous
scrutiny fix the limits of police power-which has become, within our system of criminal
law administration, the indispensable condition of non-arbitrariness in police conduct.
Police power exercised without probable cause is arbitrary. To say that the police may
accost citizens at their whim and may detain them upon reasonable suspicion is to say, in
reality, that the police may both accost and detain citizens at their whim.
Id. at 394-95 (emphasis in original) (quoting the NAACP brief).
257. See, for example, Tennessee v. Garner,471 U.S. 1 (1985) (requiring more than probable
cause that the suspect committed a crime for police to shoot him).
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overstatement of the government's interest. 258 Without the probable
cause requirement to provide a yardstick by which to measure police
searches and seizures, judges have iio standard by which to evaluate
police activities except their own opinions, 259 which often are biased in
favor of the police and against the guilty defendant after the
2 60
prosecution produces incriminating evidence.
This general balancing process would weaken the scrutiny of
those procedures already subject to the probable cause standard.
While the scope of the Amendment's protections would broaden under
a balancing rule, cases lying on both sides of the line between searches
and nonsearches would fall into the gulf.261 Courts generally would
uphold searches that once required probable cause on lesser standards. This tendency of judges would become more acute because of
the judicial inclination to admit evidence against defendants whom
they believe are guilty. Thus, although the balancing standard
potentially broadens the scope of the Amendment, it threatens to
undermine the protections already in place.262
A second argument against the use of a balancing or slidingscale formula is that police would have no bright-line rules to follow.
Police would not know what conduct conforms with the dictates of the
Amendment and, therefore, could not be deterred from acting ad-

258. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 362 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (1985). See also Sundby, 72 Minn. L. Rev. at 439 (cited in note 20) (observing
that a balancing test shifts the Fourth Amendment analysis in favor of the government).
259. Sundby, 72 Minn.' L. Rev. at 429-30 (cited in note 20) (noting that balancing tests will
invariably entail the weighing of individual judges' and justices' values at some point in the
process).
260. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and FourthAmendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881,
915-25 (1991) (recognizing the judicial bias against criminal defendants once incriminating
evidence has been found).
261. This factor motivates a push for retention of a strong probable cause standard. See New
Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating
that probable cause is the constitutional minimum for justifying a search and that the probable
cause standard reflects the proper relationship between the Warrant and Reasonableness
Clauses-the Reasonableness Clause states the purpose of the Amendment, and the Warrant
Clause gives content to the word "unreasonable" in the Reasonableness Clause). See also note
256 (citing the NAACP brief in Terry).
262. This concern, however, is weakened in the state constitutional context because the
states must, at a minimum, meet the standards set by the Fourth Amendment. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (noting that it is settled that the federal constitution, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, bans unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers). Thus, the
Fourth Amendment creates a minimum standard for determining what constitutes a search that
the states, by themselves, could not erode. Thus, the only procedures that would fall into the gulf
in the state constitutional context would be those that would not constitute searches under the
federal constitution.
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versely.263 Moreover, judges would sympathize with the police officer's
plight and seldom classify the officer's conduct as unreasonable,
thereby further undermining the Amendment's protections.6 4
Third, the text of the Amendment makes no reference to balancing, but makes explicit reference to the term "probable cause."
Adoption of a balancing approach would leave the Warrant Clause
and its probable cause standard without meaning. In fact, one could
conceive of a situation in which the Fourth Amendment never would
require a warrant based on probable cause as a prerequisite to a reasonable search and seizure. 265 This reliance on the Reasonableness
Clause alone would reduce the Warrant Clause to a relic without any
practical use. This possibility motivates Justice Scalia's concern that
use of a reasonable suspicion standard would create a new standard of
reasonableness not rooted in the text of the Amendment and not
clearly defined.266 Moreover, because the warrant and probable cause
requirements have textual roots, judicial reliance on those standards
reduces some of the fear of subjectivity and provides a yardstick by
267
which judges and police can measure reasonableness.

C. Defining a Middle Groundfor Reasonableness
The problems inherent in both the probable cause requirement
and the sliding-scale approach ultimately indicate that complete
reliance on either extreme is untenable. This acknowledgement,
however, does not answer the question of whether some tightly drawn
reasonableness formula could be devised to supplement the scope of
the Fourth Amendment without eroding its protections.2 6
The
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Hicks emphatically rejected this
standard in the pure investigatory search context, 269 but without this
lesser standard, many police intrusions into individual security and
privacy interests will go unregulated by the Amendment. Courts
could devise a reasonable suspicion standard for pure investigatory
263. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On
Drawing "BrightLines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307 (1982). But see Albert W.
Alschuler, Bright Line Feverand the FourthAmendment, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 227 (1984).
264. Amsterdam, 58 Minn.L. Rev. at 394 (cited in note 3). However, one commentator notes
that this argument is weak because it presumes that bright lines are, in fact, possible. Slobogin,
39 UCLA L. Rev. at 71 (cited in note 221).
265. Sundby, 72 Minn.L. Rev. at 416 (cited in note 20).
266. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987).
267. See Sundby, 72 Minn. L. Rev. at 387 (cited in note 20). But see id. at 415 (observing
that strict reliance on the Warrant Clause is equally difficult to justify textually because it
renders the Reasonableness Clause at best descriptive and at worst redundant).
268. See LaFave, 1 Searches and Seizures §2.1(e) at 315 (cited in note 11).
269. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328.

19941

STRETCHING TERRY

845

searches that would reaffirm the traditional reliance on probable
cause but acknowledge that certain police activities need limitations
to effectuate the Fourth Amendment's underlying concern with
arbitrary police behavior.270 The goal of this approach is to maintain
the flexibility of a sliding-scale approach while retaining the
predictability and strength of the probable cause requirement. A
reasonable suspicion standard would require a low threshold of
suspicion to ensure that police officers could state a valid justification
to explain why they took their actions.
This standard would
encourage the use of minimally intrusive alternatives rather than fullblown searches because minimal intrusions would not require the
higher probable cause standard. At the same time, the standard
would protect individuals from egregious abuses of police authority.
After determining that a reasonable suspicion standard should
apply to some police searches, one must decide which searches should
fall under this lower standard. To ensure that the middle-ground
standard does not become a black hole into which all searching activities fall, courts should develop a tightly drawn test to limit the scope
of this exception. The test should examine whether an investigative
technique constitutes a search, in a broad sense; whether constitutional limits would provide added protection to individual security; and if so, whether the technique could maintain its usefulness
under the probable cause and warrant requirements. This test would
examine explicitly the underlying factors that led the Supreme Court
to create a balancing formula and that occur implicitly in most
cases. 211 Explicit analysis of these factors would provide guidance to
lower courts and police. An activity would require reasonable
suspicion if:
(1) the challenged activity constitutes a minimal
intrusion, (2) the application of the probable cause standard would
eviscerate the value of the activity at issue without adding significantly to individual interests, and (3) existing procedural or practical
safeguards do not place reasonable limits on police discretion. This
test for reasonable suspicion reflects the Fourth Amendment test
established in Katz in that the first factor determines whether a
search occurred and the second and third factors determine what
standard of reasonableness courts should apply to the search. Thus,
this test would treat minimally intrusive searches like the Court
treated minimal seizures, or stops, in Terry.
270. See Delaware v. Prouae, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (recognizing that police may not stop
vehicles arbitrarily consistent with the Fourth Amendment, but may make these stops when they
have reasonable suspicion).
271. See Part IT.A.2 and text accompanying notes 99-108.
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1. The Intrusion Factor
The intrusion factor discerns whether the procedure at issue
constitutes a search. A search would occur when a government official
intends the technique at issue to disclose some fact about the
defendant or his possessions that the defendant reasonably expects
would otherwise remain concealed from public view?.22 This broad
conception of a search best effectuates the term's plain meaning 2 3 and
shifts the Fourth Amendment's focus away from determining whether
a search occurred to an inquiry of reasonableness. This inquiry would
focus on the item searched rather than the object sought to determine
if a search occurred. Therefore, it would modernize the scope of the
Fourth Amendment to cover a broader range of modern police tech74
niques.2
This broadened conception of a search conflicts with the narrower definition used by the Supreme Court. In Jacobsen, the Court
defined a search as occurring when the technique infringes on an
expectation of privacy that society considers reasonable.275 Although
the Court's definition potentially states a broad conception of a search,
its analysis narrows the term's potential scope by focusing on the
object of the search rather than the area searched. For example, in
Place, the Court recognized that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage, but because the
sniff disclosed only the presence or absence of contraband and no other
private fact, it did not constitute a search.276 Although there may be
some credence to the belief that criminals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their criminality, 277 the Court's test creates
the potential that police use of discrete modern technologies will go
unchecked by constitutional restraints and may become tools of
278
harassment or abuse.

272. This broad definition of search is intended to return to Katzs broad conception that
what an individual seeks to preserve as private may be constitutionally protected. See Katz v.
UnitedStates, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
273. See Pellici, 580 A.2d at 718. The Pellicci court stated that "[w]hen using dogs to ferret
out contraband, the police are not simply walking around hoping to come across evidence of a
crime. Instead they are investigating. They are trying to find something. They are seeking
evidence in hidden places. If this activity does not qualify as a 'search,' then I am not sure what
does." Id. (quoting United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1984) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting)).
274. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 113.
276. Place,462 U.S. at 707.
277. United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
278. Jacobsen,466 U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Understandably, a court wed to a probable cause requirement
for pure investigatory searches would classify as searches only those
procedures that may be analogized fairly to the intrusions posed by
more general rummaging.2 9 This high standard upholds the traditional probable cause requirement while allowing police flexibility to
serve law enforcement needs by exempting less intrusive investigative
activity from the rigors of the Fourth Amendment. 28° Unfortunately,
this process also exempts much police conduct from constitutional
scrutiny and creates the potential for arbitrary police action.28 A
broader conception of a search recognizes that the Fourth Amendment
protects against arbitrary police action and invasions of personal
privacy by assuring judicial review of a wider range of police searching
82
activities.1
For example, a canine sniff would qualify as a search under
this broad conception of the term. Although the sniff discloses a
limited amount of information about its subject, it still discloses the
contents of an area concealed from public detection. Thus, the procedure would qualify as a search, meriting some degree of justification
under the Fourth Amendment or analogous clauses in state constitutions.
2. Viability of Probable Cause
After discerning whether a search occurred, a court must determine what level of reasonableness should apply. This second prong
examines whether a probable cause requirement strikes the appropriate balance between individual and government interests in each
case. This test classifies searches into two categories: full-blown
searches and minimally intrusive searches . 2
Full-blown searches
still would be subject to the probable cause requirement, but minimal
279. See Sundby, 72 Minn. L. Rev. at 415-16 (cited in note 20) (discussing the limited scope of
the Fourth Amendment under a Warrant Clause regime).
280. See Stuntz, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 557 (cited in note 66) (noting that 'the reason these
tactics are not considered searches is that, at least in the judgment of the Supreme Court, they do
not cause substantial injury").
281. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (noting that to insist neither on
appropriate factual bases for suspicion directed at particular automobiles nor on some other
substantial and objective standard to govern police discretion invites intrusions based on nothing
more than mere hunches) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
282. See Prouse,440 U.S. at 661. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. Terry notes that an all-ornothing approach to the Fourth Amendment seeks to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the
initial stages of contact between the police officer and citizen and obscures the utility of
limitations on the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of constitutional
regulation. Id.
283. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 (1979).
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intrusions would be eligible for a lower suspicion standard. 2
This
distinction between categories of pure investigatory searches mirrors
the distinction applied in the seizure context. In addition, this distinction reflects the differing Fourth Amendment policies at work in each
situation. For a full-blown search, the Fourth Amendment protects
the citizen from unjustified invasions into privacy and arbitrary police
action. For a minimally intrusive search, the Fourth Amendment
protects primarily against arbitrary police action because the privacy
interests at stake are minimal. In practice, this distinction would
preserve police flexibility while maintaining some limited judicial
control over the conduct of less intrusive procedures. In addition, it
would encourage police officers to use the least intrusive means available to them while still assuring the citizen that the search meets
Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.
The proper inquiry to distinguish full-blown searches from
minimally intrusive ones focuses on the benefits to individual
interests and costs to police under a probable cause standard. If probable cause would provide valuable additional protection to individual
privacy interests that offset the corresponding costs of employing
probable cause, then it should apply. If a probable cause requirement
would eviscerate the purpose of the procedure, then a lower suspicion
standard should apply.285
This evisceration would occur when
requiring probable cause effectively permits the police to abandon the
challenged procedure in favor of significantly more intrusive means.
This differentiation would encourage police to use the least intrusive
means available to them while still protecting citizens from egregious
2
police behavior.
This inquiry, therefore, focuses on procedures constituting
significantly lesser intrusions into privacy than full-blown searches.
Drawing this line requires courts to make important value judgments
and involves a weighing of several different factors. First, the courts

284. This approach would satisfy some textualists because more intrusive searches and
seizures would require a traditional probable cause standard to justify the intrusion. Lesser
suspicion only would attach when the surveillance technique is one that the Framers could not
have conceived.
285. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun would allow a reasonable suspicion standard "only when the practical realities of a
particular situation suggest that a government official cannot obtain a warrant based on probable
cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search could contribute." Id.
286. Police would be more apt to use lesser intrusive techniques if those techniques required
less suspicion than more intrusive techniques because the cost to police of acquiring reasonable
suspicion is significantly less than the cost of acquiring probable cause.
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should ask what area or object was searched.87 For example, a search
of a home should receive more protection than the search of checked
luggage at an airport. 211 The home serves as the center of an individ9
ual's private life as most intimate activities occur within the home.2s
By comparison, checked luggage is given to a third party to hold, and
airline passengers expect that their belongings will be subjected to
some type of surveillance for security purposes. In addition, different
interests may arise when the individual is present during the search
or is the subject of the search. 290 Any searching procedure conducted
on a person may be so annoying, frightening, and humiliating,
29
regardless of its limited nature, that it requires probable cause. '
Second, the court should determine what information the
searching technique could reveal. A surveillance technique that
identifies only the presence or absence of a specific item amounts to a
lesser intrusion than a general rummaging.2 92 If the ability of the
officer to discover private items or facts is limited, that procedure may
constitute a minimal intrusion, which is eligible for a lower suspicion
93
standard.2
Finally, a court should weigh the officer's interest in the
procedure as a tool in crime detection and prevention against the
precise intrusion that has occurred. Thus, an ineffective procedure
may require probable cause even when it constitutes only a minimal
287. While the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, one cannot understand an
individual's privacy expectation without reference to a place. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
288. See Unruh, 713 P.2d at 378. See also Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Emperical
Look at "UnderstandingsRecognized and Permittedby Society," 42 Duke L. J. 727, 738-39 (1993).
289. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,589-90 (1980).
290. Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556,560 (Pa. 1993).
291. In Terry, the Court relied in part on the annoying, frightening, and humiliating nature
of a frisk when labeling it a search, Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25, and in Place, the Court noted that
the limited sniff of the defendant's luggage did not subject him to the embarrasment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate methods. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. See also Horton,690
F.2d at 477 (observing that the use of dogs to sniff students presented an entirely different
problem than sniffing empty automobiles and lockers); Loewy, 81 Mich. L. Rev. at 1246 (cited in
note 150); Slobogin and Schumacher, 42 Duke L. J. at 288 (cited in note 289) (ranking a dog sniff
of the body as more intrusive than a frisk). However, an approach that focuses on whether the
suspect knew of the surveillance may omit many intrusive techniques of which the suspect is
unaware from the probable cause standard. See Steinberg, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 570-72 (cited in
note 240) (discussing why the warrant process for surreptitious searches is important in
protecting a suspect's procedural rights).
292. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, a canine sniff constitutes a
lesser intrusion than an officer digging through someone's purse.
293. Although the moving of the turntable in Hicks could have exposed photographs or
papers, 480 U.S. at 325, the naked-eye viewing of plants from one thousand feet in Californiav.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), could not disclose anything so intimate or private that was not
exposed to a bird's-eye view.
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intrusion because the law enforcement benefit does not outweigh the
intrusion.2 94 Moreover, a procedure that discerns limited information
about the contents of a sealed container may be permissible on a
showing of reasonable suspicion, while the same procedure conducted
on a person or in a home might demand probable cause. By
conducting this balance openly, courts would avoid using an
expectation-of-privacy analysis that demands inconsistent logic to explain why a procedure would constitute a search requiring probable
cause in one situation, while in another it would not amount to a
search at all.295
If the court has determined that the imposition of probable
cause would not provide a commensurate benefit to personal privacy,
then it should review the search under a lower suspicion standard to
ensure that the challenged activity does not infringe on the individuals right to remain free of arbitrary police action. This test prevents
the creation of a large sliding scale by focusing the inherent balancing
into tightly formed questions. Although much of these balances are
value judgements, the balancing occurs with or without a reasonable
suspicion standard. Moreover, the creation of an intermediate
alternative allows the impostition of bright-line rules that better
reflect the degree of intrusiveness a procedure entails.
In applying this test to canine sniffs, a court can determine in
which situations a canine sniff amounts to a minimally intrusive
search. Certainly, a sniff of an object or container constitutes a significantly lesser intrusion than rumaging through it. As noted by the
Court in Place, a canine sniff does not require the opening of the
96
container or the exposure of noncontraband items to public view.
Rather, the procedure determines only the presence or absence of
drugs or other contraband items. Canine sniffs of people require a
different analysis because they resemble the frisks employed in
Terry. 97 Both procedures involve potential humiliation, fright, embarassment, and intrusion into personal privacy. 298 Thus, a canine
sniff of a person constitutes a substantial intrusion into individual
security and privacy. In addition, a sniff of a person may be subject to
294. See Stuntz, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 556 (cited in note 66) (arguing that in the broad category
of house searches, probable cause and warrants are required because the gain from searching is

ordinarily less than the loss).
295. See note 105 (discussing the inconsistency in Horton'slogic).
296. Place,462 U.S. at 707.
297. See Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 722 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
298. Terry, 392 U.S. at 25; Horton, 690 F.2d at 478. See also Loewy, 81 Mich. L. Rev. at
1246-48 (cited in note 150). Whether canine sniffs of people constitute searches under the Fourth
Amendment remains an open question, but it may be analyzed fairly under a broad reading of the
Place-Jacobsenanalysis. See notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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more false alerts than inanimate objects.29 9 A canine sniff within a
suspect's home also might constitute more than a minimal intrusion
because of the heightened interest in privacy and security in the
home. 3°0 In one case remotely addressing the issue, however, the court
ruled the sniff of a safe once contained in the home to amount to a
3 01
search requiring only reasonable suspicion.
With the exception of people and homes, canine sniffs should
not require probable cause. If courts required probable cause, police
would abandon the use of canine sniffs in favor of more intrusive
searching methods, justifiable on the same probable cause standard.302
If the Fourth Amendment should serve as a tool to encourage police to
3
use the least intrusive means necessary to detect criminal activity 03
then courts should allow most canine sniffs on a suspicion standard
less than probable cause. The standard for determining whether
courts should apply probable cause instead of reasonable suspicion
should not turn on the fact that probable cause would allow police to
conduct an even more intrusive search. 30 4 Rather, this inquiry should
center on whether the cost of applying a probable cause standard
outweighs the corresponding benefit to individual interests. Because
a canine sniff intrudes only minimally on personal privacy when not
conducted on people or in homes, the procedure does not implicate an
individual's privacy interest to an extent requiring probable cause.
Police may conduct canine sniffs arbitrarily, however, and an
individual's interest in remaining free from this conduct dictates that
a lower suspicion standard apply to ensure that police act reasonably.
3. Existence of Safeguards
Because a minimally intrusive search primarily implicates an
individual's Fourth Amendment interest in freedom from arbitrary
government intrusions, a court should inquire into whether the chal299. See Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (involving a false alert on a
student that led to a strip search of the student).
300. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325. But see Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 (noting the remoteness
that procedures like canine sniffs will disclose any private fact other than criminality).
301. See People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1986). Unruh is distinguishable from a sniff
occurring within a home because in Unruh the sniff of the safe occurred at the police station.
Thus, the dogs never entered the defendant's home. Bringing dogs into a house may amount to a
public accusation of guilt because the suspect's neighbors may witness it.
302. See Martin,626 A.2d at 565 (Montemuro, J., dissenting).
303. See generally Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least IntrusiveAlternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173, 1208-

53 (1988).
304. "[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all." Hicks, 480 U.S. at 329.
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lenged activity was left to the discretion of the officer in the field. 30 5 In
conducting this inquiry, a court should focus on whether existing
practical and procedural safeguards place adequate limits on a police
officer's discretion. If no adequate safeguards exist, then an officer
must show reasonable suspicion to justify the search. This inquiry
would serve to ferret out the most egregious abuses of police authority.
Practical safeguards are those limits inherent in the nature of
the search that restrict police behavior. For example, the possibility
that an officer, acting on a whim or for purposes of harassment, would
conduct a chemical field test of the contents of a package at a courier's
office to determine if a substance is cocaine is arguably remote. For
the field test to occur, the tested substance must be in plain view of
the officer; otherwise, he could not know of its presence.3 0 Once the
officer sees the substance in plain view, he would get no additional
satisfaction in subjecting the substance to the test. Practical limits
would safeguard against police abuse of discretion in that case.
However, an officer may have more incentive to stop a motorist to
inspect his driver's license and car registration on a whim. 30 7 This
police behavior could become a tool of harassment or intimidation, and
an officer would be more inclined to act on a hunch or whim to flex his
o8
authority.
Procedural safeguards are those established by statute or administrative regulations to ensure that police searching activities do
not occur in a random, unprincipled manner. In Delaware v. Prouse,309
the Court held that a random stop of a motorist, absent reasonable
suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment because these stops permit
the officer to exercise unbridled discretion against individual
citizens.310 The Court noted, however, that the interest in limiting
officer discretion could be served by methods other than a reasonable
suspicion standard, such as reasonable regulations limiting officer
discretion.311 Although Prouseis a regulatory case involving a seizure,
305. See Delaware v. Prouse,440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
306. These facts are adapted from United States v. Jacobsen,466 U.S. 109 (1984).
307. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
308. Limits on police resources, however, could not constitute a fair safeguard against police
discretion. If the challenged activity came before the court, by necessity, the limits on resources

did not prevent the activity from happening.

If the activity occurs only in reasonable

circumstances because of funding limits, the inquiry would still collapse into whether that conduct

was reasonable. Moreover, police departments always can change their funding priorities. See
United States v. Morales-Zamora,974 F.2d 149, 150 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing the funding of a

roadblock).
309. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
310. Id. at 663.
311. Id.
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the same conclusion could apply in the criminal search context
because minimally intrusive searches implicate the same Fourth
Amendment interest in protecting the citizen from arbitrary police
intrusions. Just because a minimally intrusive procedure is a search
rather than a seizure does not mean that the potential for unbridled
officer discretion is any less, requiring no inquiry into reasonableness,
or any greater, requiring a greater justification. Minimally intrusive
searches conducted pursuant to reasonable regulation or statute,
therefore, would satisfy the reasonableness prong of the Fourth
Amendment.312

These regulations would benefit individual, police, and judicial
interests. Regulations would satisfy individual interests because they
limit officer discretion to ensure that police searching activities are
conducted reasonably' ,3 In addition, the individual can respond to his
displeasure with the scope of the police department's searching
activities through the political process by lobbying passage of more
restrictive police regulations. A regulatory solution would serve
government interests because the government can enact regulations
that allow police to conduct some minimally intrusive searches
without suspicion. Consequently, regulations would provide clear
guidance to officers as to what standards of reasonableness they must
meet.
Moreover, the existence of regulations and statutes would
serve as guides to the courts to determine what constitutes reasonable
behavior.314 Finally, by requiring police to show either reasonable
suspicion or compliance with a regulation to justify a search, courts
would encourage police departments to develop regulations, thereby
policing themselves2'3
These regulatory safeguards will face scrutiny to determine
whether they provide adequate limitations on arbitrary police behavior and are reasonable. The court should focus on two factors. First,
the court should determine whether the statutes or regulations place
meaningful limits on officer discretion. This inquiry would weed out
those regulations that are mere attempts at immunizing police
312. See id. at 654-55. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,342 n.8 (1985).
313. Professor LaFave notes that police regulations as a means to control police discretion
are attractive because they would afford greater protection against arbitrary searches and
seizures, assure a more meaningful use of police expertise, and control Fourth Amendment
activities that never reach the courts.
Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by
Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth
Amendment Adjudication, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 442, 502 (1990).
314. Amsterdam, 58 Minn. L. Rev. at 418-19 (cited in note 3).
315. This process would ease many of the difficulties courts have policing the police. See id.
at 371.
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activity from constitutional scrutiny and ensure that the regulations
have meaning and effect. A court also should focus on whether the
officer ever could violate the regulation. If he could not, then his
discretion is not limited adequately. For some minimally intrusive
searches, reasonable regulations may not be an adequate tool to
constrain officer discretion. Those procedures always require a
reasonable suspicion standard.
If the court finds that some practical or procedural safeguard
limits the discretion to conduct the minimally intrusive search, then it
would find the search reasonable under the search and seizure clause.
If no practical or procedural limtation on officer discretion exists, then
the officer would need to produce some objective suspicion to justify
his search.
The reasonable suspicion standard would accord
appropriate deference to police officers to act on objectively articulable
suspicions while still placing limits on outrageous police conduct.
With regard to canine sniffs, a court would inquire as to the
practical or procedural safeguards that limit police discretion. In the
airport context, practical safeguards arguably exist because the police
either expose every item to the narcotics-detection dog or have individualized suspicion to discern which bags to sniff. Absent reasonable
suspicion for an individualized sniff or regulations to ensure that
every bag is searched, however, no practical limits on police discretion
exist because the officer still could decide arbitrarily which bags to
expose to the dog. This broad police authority would conflict with the
Fourth Amendment interest in freedom from arbitrary police
behavior. Another practical limit may exist when the officer must
seize the object he intends to expose to the dog. Of course, the court
must find this seizure reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 316 In
many instances, however, a technical seizure is unnecessary to subject
an item to a sniff.317 In addition, if the police need reasonable
suspicion to seize the item, a reasonable suspicion standard for the
sniff would impose no additional burden on police. Absent reasonable
regulatory or statutory standards ensuring that police may not
conduct random, arbitrary canine sniffs, the police must have an
individualized, reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigative
activity. 318
316. See Place,462 U.S. at 706.
317. For example, dogs may sniff luggage in overhead bins aboard a bus without a technical
seizure occuring. See, for example, United States v. Harvey, 961 F.2d 1361, 1363-64 (8th Cir.
1992).
318. A balancing of the necessity of the regulation against the intrusiveness of the search
also may indicate that the procedure should require probable cause before an officer conducts it.
The regulatory safeguard envisions canine sniffs of every item to be sniffed, yet sniffs of people or
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V. CONCLUSION

By recognizing that Terry's reasonable suspicion standard may
apply to canine sniffs, several states have expanded the scopes of their
constitutions' search and seizure clauses beyond the Fourth
Amendment's scope as defined in Arizona v. Hicks.31 The Supreme
Court should recognize a limited reasonable suspicion standard for
pure investigatory searches, as it has done for pure investigatory
seizures. Absent this change in doctrine, other states should take this
approach to effectuate the Fourth Amendment's protection, not only in
personal privacy but also in freedom from arbitrary government intrusion, in pure investigatory searches. Otherwise, many searching
activities, such as canine sniffs, will continue to go unregulated by the
Amendment, and police will have free reign to conduct these searches
as they please.
Although this marked shift in doctrine will provide state courts
with opportunities to modernize search and seizure law and keep pace
with modern police practice, this shift poses dangers as well. A broad
shift ultimately could undermine the protections provided by the
probable cause requirement. Although the federal constitution places
limits on what may constitute a search requiring probable cause,
courts applying a reasonable suspicion standard to pure investigatory
searches that constitute minimal intrusions must not create a broad
rule that will erode their state constitutional protections. These
courts should not rely on a broad reasonableness standard too readily,
as the Supreme Court has in other contexts. 320 Rather, the states
should develop a tightly construed and narrowly defined exception to
the probable cause requirement, as the Pennsylvania court did in
Commonwealth v. Martin.321 This tightly drawn exception would allow
the flexibility to regulate all stages of police contact with the
individual while maintaining the bright-line character of the probable
cause requirement.
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homes may never be tolerable except on some individualized suspicion. This factor would indicate
that sniffs of people and homes should require probable cause before they are conducted.
319. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
320. See, for example, Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989);

O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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